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Abstract
This paper provides a county-level investigation of the root causes of gun violence in the U.S. To
guide our empirical analysis, we develop a simple theoretical model which suggests that firearm-related
oﬀenses in a given county increase with the number of illegal guns and decrease with social capital
and police intensity. Using detailed panel data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the period
1986-2014, we find empirical evidence for the causal eﬀects of illegal guns, social capital, and police
intensity consistent with our theoretical predictions. Based on our analysis, we derive a range of policy
recommendations.
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1 Introduction
It is diﬃcult to overestimate the severity of gun violence in the United States. In the period between
2001 to 2014, the Center for Disease and Control Prevention (CDC) recorded 164,089 firearm
homicides. Over the same period of time, the number of non-fatal injuries caused by gunshots
is estimated to be more than sixfold – a total of 1,002,647.1 While these numbers are striking
in themselves, the extent of gun violence in the U.S. becomes even more blatant in international
comparisons. According to the United Nations Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the number
of gun murders per capita in the U.S. in 2012 was nearly 30 times higher compared to the U.K.2
Not surprisingly, the issue of gun violence has become one of the most pertinent topics in the
political and public discourse of the United States. Unfortunately, this debate is still seldomly
based on scientific analysis of facts and empirical evidence. The current paper contributes to this
discussion by providing a large-scale investigation of the explanatory factors of gun-related oﬀenses
using novel county-level data. Moreover, our aim is to go beyond conditional correlations and come
closer towards a causal inference of the sources of gun violence in the United States.
Figures 1 and 2 provide a first glance at the distribution of gun violence across U.S. counties over
the period 2000-2010.3 More specifically, Fig. 1 depicts the average per capita number of gun-caused
homicides, while Fig. 2 displays the average per capita number of gun-related robberies. Notably,
the prevalence of gun violence varies substantially, even within individual states. The average
standard deviation of gun-caused homicides (sd = 0.020) and gun-related robberies (sd = 0.261)
among counties within a given state are comparable in size to standard deviations of the respective
oﬀense type across all U.S. counties (sd = 0.025 and sd = 0.327, respectively).
Figure 1. Per capita number of gun-caused homicides, 2000-2010. Data source: Uniform Crime Reporting.
1 Source: https://1.usa.gov/1plXBux and https://1.usa.gov/1qo12RL.
2 See https://data.unodc.org.
3 These figures are constructed using Uniform Crime Reporting data by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
drawn from https://icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/57. See section 3.1.1 for data description.
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Figure 2. Per capita number of gun-related robberies, 2000-2010. Data source: Uniform Crime Reporting.
What are the factors that can explain this variation? Although the media and press are ripe
with anecdotes on potential explanatory factors, there is no consensus on this topic in the literature.
To lend structure to this complex debate and to guide our empirical investigation, we develop
a novel theoretical model of gun-related crime. In our model, individuals diﬀer with respect to
criminal inclinations, defined as the willingness and ability to extract a booty from law-abiding
citizens through unlawful behavior (e.g., robbery). Depending on their criminal inclinations, agents
decide whether to become law-abiding citizens employed in the legal sector or, alternatively, become
criminals and earn a living via illegal activities. Individuals who engage in criminal activities choose
whether to stay unarmed or acquire a gun and commit firearm-related felonies. Gun acquisition
is costly, but possession of a gun has a threatening eﬀect on a victim and allows a felon to reap a
higher booty. In equilibrium, only the most criminally inclined individuals commit armed crimes,
whereas agents with low criminal inclinations act unarmed.
This simple framework allows us to analyze the eﬀects of various factors on the (per capita)
number of firearm oﬀenses in a given county. In particular, we derive the following three key
hypotheses: First, gun-related oﬀenses increase with the number of illegal guns. Intuitively, a
larger number of illegal guns in circulation decreases the costs of obtaining an illegal weapon and,
thereby, increases the expected payoﬀ from gun-related oﬀenses. Second, firearm oﬀenses decrease
with the level of social capital, broadly defined as shared beliefs and values that contribute to a
well-functioning society. In our model, social capital shapes the distribution of criminal inclinations
in a given region: Counties with a high level of social capital have more individuals with low
criminal inclinations and fewer individuals with high criminal inclinations. Given that only the
most criminally inclined individuals commit a firearm-related crime, gun violence decreases with
the level of social capital. Third, gun-related oﬀenses decrease with police intensity. Intuitively, a
higher police presence increases the probability of detection and, thereby, decreases the expected
payoﬀ from gun-related oﬀenses.
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Although the focus of our analysis lies on explaining the causes of gun-related oﬀenses, our
theoretical framework suggests that the identified key explanatory factors – illegal guns, social
capital, and police intensity – drive the variation in total (i.e., armed and unarmed) oﬀenses. More
specifically, the model predicts that the (per capita) number of oﬀenses in a given county increases
with the number of illegal guns and decreases with social capital and police intensity. The intuition
behind these predictions draws on the theoretical results that an armed felon commits ceteris paribus
more oﬀenses compared to an unarmed one. Hence, even though a lower number of illegal guns in
circulation, a higher level of social capital, and a higher police intensity may induce some criminals
to switch from armed to unarmed oﬀenses, the overall number of oﬀenses in a given region decreases.
To bring our hypotheses to the data, we construct a novel county-level panel dataset which con-
tains information on the number of (gun-related) oﬀenses, police intensity, proxies for the availability
of illegal guns, and a wide range of socioeconomic factors. Crime-related information is drawn from
the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) database for the period 1986-2014. This data is collected by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from more than 18,000 local law enforcement agencies
and provides detailed county-level information on the incidence of crime known to the police. With
more than 90% of U.S. counties represented in this dataset, it serves fairly well our goal of giving
a comprehensive account of crime in the United States. To the best of our knowledge, it is the
only publicly available source of information on gun violence at such a high level of disaggregation.4
Throughout the analysis, we consider four alternative outcome variables – gun-related robberies,
gun-caused homicides, total robberies, and total homicides. We further draw from the UCR annual
information on police oﬃcers and police employees to measure police intensity in a given county.
This paper suggests a novel proxy for the prevalence of illegal guns.5 More specifically, we exploit
annual UCR information on gun thefts reported to police departments. Given that stolen guns are
by definition available to criminals, our proxy provides a direct measure for the variation in the
number of illegal guns in a given region. A further advantage of our measure lies in its availability
for the vast majority of counties over the entire period of 1986-2014.
Following the seminal work by Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000), we approximate the level of so-
cial capital with the associational density in a given county. To obtain a time-varying measure of
associational activism, we exploit annual data on the prevalence of religious, social and civic organi-
zations (such as community, parent-teacher, students’, scouting, retirement, or ethnic associations),
reported by the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) for the period 1986-2014.
The idea behind this proxy is that voluntary participation in (non-profit) associational activities
boosts social interaction and cooperation and, thereby, promotes the norms of reciprocity and trust.
4 Apart from a few county-level studies discussed below, the vast majority of research on this topic has been
conducted using state-level data, see, e.g., Azrael et al. (2004), Fleegler et al. (2013), Gius (2013), Kalesan et al.
(2016), Lanza (2014) and Siegel et al. (2013, 2014a,b). Clearly, such an approach cannot account for substantial
within-state variation in gun violence documented in Fig. 1 and 2. Our county-level analysis allows us to explore
this variation, while eﬀectively controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across states using state fixed eﬀects.
5 Previous studies used subscriptions to the Guns & Ammo magazine (Duggan (2001)) or the percentage of suicides
committed with a firearm (Cook and Ludwig (2006)) as indirect proxies for the gun prevalence in a given county.
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We start our empirical analysis by exploring conditional correlations in a cross-section of coun-
ties. Controlling for more than a dozen alternative explanations of gun violence (such as organized
crime, criminal networks, urbanization, education, fractionalization, poverty), as well as state fixed
eﬀects, we find the per capita number of gun-related oﬀenses to be positively correlated with the
number of illegal guns and negatively correlated with social capital and police intensity. Although
these correlations are in line with our theoretical predictions, they do not allow causal interpretation
for at least two reasons: First, the relationships may be confounded by omitted variables (such as
history, political preferences, etc.). Second, the results obtained from cross-sectional regressions are
prone to the issue of reverse causality: A large number of illegal guns may be the outcome (rather
than the source) of a higher prevalence of firearm oﬀenses. Similarly, social capital may ‘deteriorate’
whereas police presence may increase in regions where gun-related oﬀenses are frequent. To address
both issues, we then turn to panel data analysis. This approach allows us to account for unobserv-
able county-specific factors using county fixed eﬀects. Moreover, by exploiting time-lagged variation
in illegal guns, social capital, and police intensity we move closer towards a causal inference.
Using UCR panel data for the period 1986-2014, we find a positive eﬀect of lagged gun thefts in
a given county, and negative eﬀects of lagged associational density and lagged police intensity on
the per capita number of gun-related and total oﬀenses, controlling for state-year and county fixed
eﬀects. We further document that gun thefts, associational activism, and police intensity from any
of the previous three years have a significant impact on the contemporaneous extent of gun violence
in a given county. Although this evidence suggests that a high number of illegal guns is not merely
a ‘byproduct’ of firearm oﬀenses, it does not preclude the possibility that criminals steal a weapon
in a given year to use it in a future period. In other words, past gun thefts may still be endogenous
to current gun violence. We account for this endogeneity problem by constructing an alternative
measure of illegal guns based on gun thefts in the neighboring states. More specifically, we calculate
for each county the total value of guns stolen in all states adjacent to the one in which a given
county is located, weighted by bilateral distances and other relevant factors. The idea behind this
proxy builds on the fact that illegal guns are frequently transported over state borders, and a higher
number of gun thefts in the neighboring states is likely to increase the number of illegal guns in a
given county.6 The identifying assumption behind this approach is that an individual county is too
small to drive the variation in gun thefts across all neighboring states over time. In other words,
the total incidence of past gun thefts across all adjacent states is plausibly exogenous to firearm
oﬀenses in a single county of the neighboring state.7 Using this alternative measure, we provide
robust evidence for the positive causal eﬀect of illegal guns on the number of gun-related oﬀenses.
Our theoretical model relates to the economics of crime literature, originating with the seminal
contribution by Becker (1968).8 At the heart of this literature lies the so-called ‘deterrence hypoth-
6 According to Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010), 30% of guns recovered in 2009 from a crime scene in a given
state were originally purchased in a diﬀerent state. Adjacent states constitute the major source of illegal guns,
see https://www.atf.gov/about/firearms-trace-data-2015.
7 We conduct a wide range of robustness checks to preclude possible violations of this identifying assumption.
8 See Freeman (1999) and Draca and Machin (2015) for reviews of this literature.
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esis’, which states that the expected utility of crime ceteris paribus decreases in the probability of
detection and in the associated penalty. Our theoretical framework corroborates this hypothesis
and contributes to the literature in three major ways. First, it explicitly introduces gun-related il-
legal activities – alongside unarmed felony – into the model. Second, assuming heterogeneity across
individuals with respect to their criminal inclinations, our framework provides for the coexistence of
unarmed and armed crime in equilibrium. Third, by linking the distribution of criminal inclinations
to the level of social capital in a given region, we derive a testable prediction regarding the eﬀect of
social norms and values on gun violence.
The latter contribution deserves further attention in light of the literature debate. Becker’s
(1968) approach of modeling crime solely in terms of economic costs and benefits has invoked some
criticism from sociologists and criminologists, who argue that illegal behavior is generally socialized
and that crime cannot be fully understood without knowledge of the social background from which
it originates, see, e.g., Hirschi (1969, 1986). The latter view is reinforced by the empirical evidence
provided by Glaeser et al. (1996), who find that no more than 30% of the variation in crime rates
within New York City can be explained by pecuniary factors and observable local area characteristics
and assert that a major share of diﬀerences in crime rates must arise from social norms and civic
interactions, cf. also Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999).9 Our theoretical framework aims to build
a bridge between the economic view of crime along the lines of Becker’s (1968) and alternative
conceptions of criminal behavior suggested by sociologists.
From the empirical perspective, our paper relates to two seminal studies that use UCR county-
level data to investigate the eﬀect of guns on (gun-related) crime. In a panel of the 444 largest
counties over the period 1980-1998, Duggan (2001) finds a positive relationship between subscrip-
tions to Guns & Ammo – one of the nation’s largest gun magazines – and homicide rates. Using
panel data for the 200 largest counties in the period 1980-1999, Cook and Ludwig (2006) find a
positive correlation between the percentage of suicides committed with a firearm – their proxy for
the prevalence of guns in the population – and a county’s homicide rate. Our contribution to this
literature is threefold. First, we suggest a novel, more direct proxy for gun prevalence based on gun
thefts. Second, we implement our analysis in a larger sample of (more than 2,500) U.S. counties
over a longer period of time. Third, and most importantly, by exploring time variation in illegal
guns due to gun thefts in neighboring states, we move closer towards a causal inference regarding
the eﬀect of guns on gun violence.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop a simple theoretical
model of crime and derive our testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes our dataset and presents the
empirical results from the cross-section of counties (section 3.1) and the panel data analysis (section
3.2). In section 4, we discuss the policy implications of our work. Section 5 concludes.
9 Several studies establish a negative correlation between social capital (as measured by voter turnouts or member-
ship in civic organizations) and crime at the U.S. state level, see Galea et al. (2002), Kennedy et al. (1998), Mess-
ner et al. (2004), Rosenfeld et al. (2001), Saegert and Winkel (2004). Using instrumental variables approach,
recent empirical contributions report a negative causal impact of social capital on crime in Italy (Buonanno et al.
(2009)), Netherlands (Akçomak and ter Weel (2012)), and a cross-section of countries (Lederman et al. (2002)).
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2 The Model
Consider a region (county) populated by a unit measure of individuals who diﬀer with respect to
their criminal abilities c 2 (0, 1].10 Individuals with a higher c can ceteris paribus extract a larger
booty from law-abiding citizens. Criminal inclinations are distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function F (c), with a continuous density function f(c).
Each individual decides whether to become a law-abiding citizen and earn his or her living by
legal employment or become a criminal and engage in illegal activities. The compensation of law-
abiding citizens is given by a constant wage rate, w > 0. Criminals can expropriate wages from
law-abiding citizens (for instance, via a robbery). Each felon decides upon the number of oﬀenses
(robberies) x, and chooses whether to act unarmed or to buy a gun in order to increase his booty.
Consider first the maximization problem of an unarmed criminal. The booty (b) of an unarmed
(u) felon is proportional to the number of committed oﬀenses, his criminal ability, and the victim’s
wage (income) level, i.e., bu = xcw. This booty can only be reaped with probability (1    ), since
with the inverse probability   2 (0, 1) a criminal is detected and caught. In the latter case, a felon
is charged with a monetary penalty px, which is proportional to the number of committed oﬀenses
(robbed individuals).11 For simplicity, we assume a constant penalty rate p > 0, which can be
thought of as a fine or an imprisonment sentence imposed for a given oﬀense.12 The expected payoﬀ
of an unarmed felon can thus be expressed as:
max
x
E(⇡u) = (1   )(xcw)↵    px, (1)
whereby ↵ 2 (0, 1) is a constant that governs diminishing marginal utility from a monetary booty.
This optimization problem yields the maximum number of oﬀenses committed by an unarmed felon
with a criminal ability c:
xu = (cw)
↵
1 ↵
✓
1   
 
↵
p
◆ 1
1 ↵
. (2)
Substituting for x in equation (1), we obtain the expected payoﬀ of an unarmed felon:
E(⇡u) =
✓
cw
p
◆ ↵
1 ↵
B( ), (3)
whereby
B( ) ⌘
✓
1   
 ↵
◆ 1
1 ↵
(1  ↵)↵ ↵1 ↵ (4)
is defined for notational simplicity. Note that B0( ) < 0 for all  ,↵ 2 (0, 1). A simple inspection of
equations (2) and (3) reveals that both the number of unarmed oﬀenses and the associated expected
payoﬀ increase in the felon’s criminal ability (c) and in the wage rate of law-abiding citizens (w),
10 Throughout the paper, we use the terms ‘criminal ability’ and ‘criminal inclination’ interchangeably.
11 Our definition of a penalty includes, but is not limited to, imprisonment or unpaid community service, since
both punishments deprive an individual of monetary earnings.
12 Assuming non-linear penalties significantly overcomplicates our analysis without changing the main predictions.
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and decrease in the probability of detection ( ) and in the associated penalty (p).
Consider now the maximization problem of an armed (a) criminal. Let g > 0 denote the costs
of obtaining a gun and assume that these costs are the same across all felons in a given region. For
any given number of oﬀenses x, the booty of an armed felon with a criminal ability c is given by
ba =  xcw. A constant   > 1 reflects an increase in the payoﬀ due to the fact that victims are
threatened with a gun. The maximization problem of an armed felon can thus be expressed as
max
x
E(⇡a) = (1   )( xcw)↵    px  g. (5)
This optimization problem yields the maximum number of oﬀenses committed by an armed felon:
xa = ( cw)
↵
1 ↵
✓
1   
 
↵
p
◆ 1
1 ↵
, (6)
and the associated expected payoﬀ:
E(⇡a) =
✓
 cw
p
◆ ↵
1 ↵
B( )  g, (7)
whereby B( ) is given by equation (4). As before, the number of oﬀenses and the expected payoﬀ
increase in a felon’s criminal ability and in the wage rate of law-abiding citizens, and decrease in
the probability of detection and the associated penalty. It is also evident from the comparison of
equations (2) and (6) that xa > xu, i.e., an armed felon commits ceteris paribus a larger number of
oﬀenses. Yet, the expected payoﬀ of an armed criminal is not necessarily higher than the expected
payoﬀ of an unarmed felon because the gain in the booty due to the gun-threatening eﬀect has to
be weighted against the costs of obtaining a gun. This tradeoﬀ can be illustrated in a diagram
with c
↵
1 ↵ – a monotonically transformed measure of an individual’s criminal inclination – on the
horizontal axis, see Figure 3. Both E(⇡u) and E(⇡a) linearly increase in c
↵
1 ↵ , cf. equations (3)
and (7). Yet, E(⇡a) has a negative vertical intercept (due to g > 0) and is steeper than E(⇡u) due
to the gun-threatening eﬀect (  > 1). Figure 3 thus suggests the following sorting pattern: Most
criminally inclined individuals engage in armed oﬀenses, since their expect payoﬀ is high enough
to compensate the costs of acquiring a gun; individuals with intermediate criminal abilities commit
unarmed felonies; the least criminally inclined individuals – whose expected payoﬀ from an unarmed
felony E(⇡u) is smaller than the wage rate w – become law-abiding citizens.
Using equations (3) and (7), one can easily derive cutoﬀ criminal inclinations for engaging in
unarmed and armed oﬀenses. More specifically, equating the expected payoﬀ from an unarmed
felony with the wage rate, E(⇡u(cu)) = w, one obtains a cutoﬀ criminal inclination, cu, for which an
individual is indiﬀerent between becoming a law-abiding citizen or committing an unarmed oﬀense.
All individuals with c  cu are employed in the legal sector while those with c > cu engage in illegal
behavior. From E(⇡a(ca)) = E(⇡u(ca)), we obtain the second threshold, ca, such that a felon with
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Figure 3. Sorting into legal and illegal activities.
this criminal inclination is just indiﬀerent between being armed or not, and all individuals with
c > ca commit an armed (rather than unarmed) crime. Using equations (3) and (7), we obtain:
cu = w
1 2↵
↵ pB( ) 
1 ↵
↵ , ca =
 
g
B( )( 
↵
1 ↵   1)
! 1
1 ↵ p
w
. (8)
Before we discuss the determinants of (armed) oﬀenses, a few remarks are in order. If the
E(⇡a)-line is suﬃciently flat, the equilibrium cutoﬀ ca may lie outside of the unit interval, in which
case no individual has an incentive to commit an armed oﬀense. Conversely, a suﬃciently steep
E(⇡a)-line may lead to ca < cu, in which case all oﬀenses are firearm-related. In order to ensure
that a firearm-related felony is neither a strictly dominated nor a strictly dominant strategy of all
criminals, we impose parameter restrictions on exogenous parameters ↵,  , p, and w that fulfill
Assumption 1. 0  cu  ca  1.
Bearing in mind that the measure of individuals has been normalized to unity, the per capita
number of armed oﬀenses in a given region can be expressed as:
Na =
Z 1
ca
xaf(c)dc, (9)
whereby xa and ca are given by equations (6) and (8), respectively. Notice that, for any combination
of xa and ca, the per capita number of firearm oﬀenses depends on the distribution of criminal
capabilities in a given region, f(c). To investigate the eﬀect of a society’s criminal inclination
on the prevalence of firearm oﬀenses, we impose a functional form for F (c). In what follows, we
assume that criminal inclinations are distributed according to the bounded (upper-truncated) Pareto
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function:
F (c) =
1    cminc  
1  cmin
, (10)
whereby  > 0 is the shape parameter of this distribution function, cmin > 0 represents the lower
bound of the support, and the upper bound of c has been set equal to one. Figure 4 depicts the
Pareto density function f(c) associated with the cumulative distribution function from equation
(10) for two values of  – a high and a low one. Lower values of  reflect a more criminally inclined
society and vice versa. The reason for assuming that criminal inclinations are distributed Pareto
is twofold. First, as shown in the Online Appendix C, this functional form provides a good fit to
the actual distribution of criminal activities within U.S. states and counties. Second, given that the
behavior of this distribution function is fully characterized by a single parameter (), it allows us
to derive our testable predictions in the simplest possible manner.
Figure 4. Distribution of criminal inclinations.
Using equations (6), (8), (9), and (10), we establish
Proposition 1. The per capita number of armed oﬀenses, Na
(i) decreases in the costs of obtaining a gun, g
(ii) decreases as the society becomes less criminally inclined, i.e., as  increases
(iii) decreases in the probability of detection,  .
Proof. See Online Appendix B.1.
The intuition behind Proposition 1(i) can be easily inferred from Fig. 5. An increase in the costs
of obtaining a gun, g decreases the expected payoﬀ from an armed felony and the E(⇡a)-line shifts
downwards. As a result, the cutoﬀ ca – above which criminals are willing to engage in a firearm-
related crime – rises and the per capita number of gun-related crimes ceteris paribus decreases.
The logic behind Proposition 1(ii) is illustrated in Fig. 4. An increase in  decreases the density of
the distribution function for any c   ca – where criminals commit firearm oﬀenses. Hence, the per
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capita number of gun-related oﬀenses decreases as the society becomes less criminally inclined. Part
(iii) of Proposition 1 results from the interplay of two eﬀects. First, an increase in the probability
of detection   reduces the expected benefits from criminal activities for any given c, which can
be illustrated as a clockwise pivoting of E(⇡u) and E(⇡a) in Fig. 6. Yet, given that   > 1, the
E(⇡a)-line decreases at a higher rate (cf. equations (3) and (7)). As a result, the equilibrium cutoﬀ
ca increases (cf. equation (8)) and the number of individuals engaged in armed felonies goes down.
Second, a higher probability of detection implies a lower number of oﬀenses xa per armed individual
(cf. equation (6)). The latter eﬀect reinforces the former and implies a lower per capita number of
firearm-related oﬀenses due to an increase in the probability of detection  .
Figure 5. The eﬀect of an increase in gun costs, g0 > g. Figure 6. The eﬀect of the probability of detection,  0 >  .
Before turning to the derivation of further results, it is worth pausing to briefly discuss the
generality of Proposition 1. First, it should be noted that parts (i) and (iii) hold for any distribution
of criminal inclinations and do not hinge on the specific distributional assumption from equation
(10). Second, assuming that F (c) is distributed Pareto, the criminal inclination of the society can be
alternatively captured as an increase in cmin (rather than a decrease in ). We verify in the Online
Appendix B.1 that Na rises in cmin. This result reinforces Proposition 1(ii) and suggests that the
per capita number of armed oﬀenses decreases as the society becomes less criminally inclined.
Our model can be further used to study the eﬀect of crime-related penalties p and the wage
rate w on Na. As shown in the Online Appendix B.1, the per capita number of armed oﬀenses
decreases in p. The logic behind this result can be easily inferred from Fig. 3. Due to an increase in
p, both E(⇡u) and E(⇡a) pivot clockwise, yet the E(⇡a)-line does so at a higher rate (since   > 1,
cf. equations (3) and (7)). As a result, the cutoﬀ ca shifts to the right and fewer criminals commit
armed oﬀenses. Moreover, given that xa decreases in p (see equation (6)), the number of oﬀenses
committed by an armed criminal ceteris paribus decreases. Both eﬀects imply a lower per capita
number of armed oﬀenses due to an increase in p. We further show in the Online Appendix B.1 that
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Na increases in w. The mechanism behind this result can once again be illustrated using Fig. 3.
Due to an increase in w, both E(⇡u) and E(⇡a) pivot counter-clockwise, yet the E(⇡a)-line does so
at a higher rate (since   > 1, cf. equations (3) and (7)). Hence, the equilibrium cutoﬀ ca decreases
and more individuals commit armed oﬀenses. Moreover, a higher wage rate of law-abiding citizens
induces armed felons to commit a larger number of oﬀenses xa (cf. equation (6)).13 Hence, the per
capita number of armed oﬀenses increases in w. Since we do not explicitly model the legal sector of
the economy and follow a very reductionist approach in modeling the penalties, we do not formulate
propositions regarding the eﬀects of w and p on Na. Nevertheless, we account for these factors in
our empirical analysis.
Thus far, we have focused on studying the determinants of armed oﬀenses. Yet, our model can
also be used to derive predictions regarding the number of total (i.e., armed and unarmed) oﬀenses.
Bearing in mind that that the measure of individuals has been normalized to unity, the per capita
number of oﬀenses in a given region reads:
N =
Z ca
cu
xuf(c)dc+
Z 1
ca
xaf(c)dc, (11)
whereby xu and xa are given by equations (2) and (6), respectively, while cu and ca are given by
equation (8). Analyzing this expression, we establish
Proposition 2. The per capita number of oﬀenses, N
(i) decreases in the costs of obtaining a gun, g
(ii) decreases as the society becomes less criminally inclined, i.e. as  increases
(iii) decreases in the probability of detection,  .
Proof. See Online Appendix B.2.
Note that g, , and   aﬀect N in the same direction as they impact Na in Proposition 1. The
intuition behind Proposition 2(i) can be inferred from Fig. 5: Individuals with criminal inclinations
c 2 (ca, c0a) – who would have committed armed oﬀenses before an increase in g – decide to engage in
unarmed crime instead. Given that armed felons commit ceteris paribus a higher number of oﬀenses
compared to unarmed ones (cf. equations (2) and (6)), the per capita number of oﬀenses decreases
in the costs of obtaining a gun, g. The logic behind Proposition 2(ii) is illustrated in Fig. 4. An
increase in  decreases the density of the distribution function for any c   cu – where criminals
engage in crime – and the per capita number of oﬀenses decreases.14 Lastly, one can use Fig. 6 to
infer the intuition behind Proposition 2(iii). Since both cu and ca increase in   (see equation (8)),
13 Note that an increase in the wage rate also raises the opportunity costs of illegal behavior, which can be illustrated
as an upward shift of the w-line. Yet, in our simple model, the decision of a criminal whether to commit an
armed vs. unarmed oﬀense is unaﬀected by the criminal’s opportunity costs but rather depends on the value of
the booty, the probability of detection, and the associated punishment.
14 As before, this result is qualitatively unchanged if we capture an increase in the criminal inclination of a society
via an increase in cmin (rather than a decrease in ).
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fewer individuals engage in criminal activities. Moreover, individuals with c 2 (ca, c0a) – who would
have previously engaged in armed felonies – switch to unarmed crime, which further reduces the
per capita number of oﬀenses due to the fact that xa > xu (cf. equations (2) and (6)).
As in the case of Proposition 1, it should be noted that parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition 2
do not hinge on the assumption of Pareto-distributed criminal inclinations and are established for
a general distribution function F (c). One can further show that the per capita number of total
oﬀenses N decreases in the penalty rate p. Yet, the eﬀect of the wage rate w on N is no longer
unambiguously positive. The reason behind this ambiguity depends on the interplay of two eﬀects.
On the one hand, a higher income of law-abiding citizens ceteris paribus raises the monetary booty
and increases the number of oﬀenses. On the other hand, an increase in w raises the opportunity
costs of unarmed crime and induces some unarmed felons to become law-abiding citizens. Without
imposing further restriction on model parameters, the overall eﬀect of w on N is ambiguous.
2.1 Hypotheses
In this section, we draw on insights from the economics, sociology, and criminology literature to
map key model parameters to observable factors and, thereby, formulate our testable hypotheses.
What determines the costs of obtaining a gun, g? According to the recent report by the U.S.
Department of Justice (Planty and Truman (2013)), the primary source of firearms for criminals
is an illegal market (see also Cook et al. (2015)). Cook et al. (2007) provide some insight into the
underground gun market by conducting interviews with gang members and gun dealers in the city
of Chicago. One of the key insights of this study is that the underground gun market is ‘thin’, and
that the acquisition of an illegal firearm is associated with substantial transaction (search) costs and
large mark-ups over legal prices. A standard economic analysis of such a market would imply that
the costs of obtaining an illegal gun are decreasing in the supply of illegal guns. We thus maintain
the following functional relationship:
g = f(illegal guns
 
).
How do we map the criminal inclination of a given county (1/) to the data? Philosophers such
as David Hume, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill have for a long time emphasized the role of
moral sentiments such as guilt, shame, and remorse in shaping moral behavior and, in particular,
an individual’s willingness to commit a crime.15 Recent theoretical contributions by Bénabou and
Tirole (2006, 2011), Funk (2006) and Weibull and Villa (2006) study these aspects by explicitly
introducing social norms into the models of crime, see McAdams and Rasmusen (2007) and van der
Weele (2012) for reviews of this literature. Since the seminal contributions by Coleman (1988,
1990) and Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000), sociologists and political scientists generally refer to the
15 Perhaps the best belles-lettres account of mental anguish and moral dilemma of a delinquent is provided in
Dostoevsky’s “Crime and Punishment”: “If [a thief] has a conscience, he will suﬀer for his delinquency. That will
be his punishment – as well as the prison.”
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shared values and eﬀective norms that evoke those sentiments and, thereby, prevent a person from
committing a crime as ‘social capital’.16 As discussed in the introduction, ample empirical evidence
suggests that social capital has a crime-deterring eﬀect. Based on this evidence, we assert that  –
an inverse measure of a society’s criminal inclination – is a positive function of social capital:
 = f(social capital
+
).
Next, consider the probability of detection,  . Arguably, this probability is primarily a function
of police intensity. Since the seminal contribution by Levitt (1997), economists have suggested
several strategies to identify the causal eﬀect of policing on crime deterrence, see Nagin (2013) and
Draca and Machin (2015) for reviews of this literature. Among the most convincing approaches,
is the usage of terrorist attacks or alerts as an instrument for exogenous (re-)allocations of police
resources. In such a quasi-experimental setting, several contributions find a robust positive eﬀect of
police intensity on crime deterrence in many cities, including Buenos Aires (Di Tella and Schargrod-
sky (2004)), the District of Columbia (Klick and Tabarrok (2005)), London (Draca et al. (2011)),
and Stockholm (Poutvaara and Priks (2006)). In view of this evidence, we treat   as a positive
function of police intensity:
  = f(police intensity
+
).
Above-mentioned inquiries merely suggest functional dependencies of the model parameters, g,
, and  . Combining these relationships with our results derived in Propositions 1 and 2, we expect
a positive eﬀect of illegal guns and a negative eﬀect of social capital and police intensity on the per
capita number of armed (Na) and total (N) oﬀenses (henceforth, summarized as N(a)):
N(a) = f(illegal guns
+
, social capital
 
, police intensity
 
). (12)
Before turning to the empirical implementation of our hypotheses, it is worth pausing to discuss
some potential concerns with our analysis. First, our model is admittedly very simple. In particular,
it does not allow law-abiding citizens to (legally) acquire firearms in order to protect themselves
from oﬀenders.17 Given that oﬃcial county-level data on legal gun ownership are, to the best
of our knowledge, not available, we do not formulate a hypothesis regarding the impact of legal
guns on the relative prevalence of firearm oﬀenses in the first place.18 Nevertheless, our empirical
analysis considers indirect proxies for legal gun ownership suggested in the literature (see footnote 5).
Moreover, to the extent that the stock of legal guns in a given county is determined by state-specific
16 According to Coleman (1990), social capital is the set of relationships that support eﬀective norms “[...] that
inhibit crimes in a city, make it possible for women to walk freely outside at night and for old people to leave
their homes without fear.”
17 The eﬀect of legal gun ownership on crime is highly debated in the literature. Lott and Mustard (1997) and
Bronars and Lott (1998) argue that a higher prevalence of firearms among law-abiding citizens might reduce
crime. Yet, several more recent empirical studies have shown that the “more guns, less crime” hypothesis does
not hold empirically, see, e.g., Duggan (2001) and Ayres and Donohue (2003).
18 In Kukharskyy and Seiﬀert (2016), we study the eﬀect of legal gun ownership on crime using novel state-level data.
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gun control laws, we account for this potential confounding factor using state fixed eﬀects.
Second, one can rightly argue that illegal guns, social capital, and police intensity aﬀect N(a) via
more than one model parameter. What are the potential alternative channels? For instance, one
might assert that social capital has a positive eﬀect on the probability of detection,  . Intuitively,
members of communities with pronounced civic participation are more likely to report crimes to
the police, bring disputes to the attention of courts and law enforcement agencies, and engage in
public surveillance. Yet, given that the prevalence of firearm oﬀenses, is decreasing both in  and  
(see Propositions 1 and 2), this alternative channel reinforces the predicted negative eﬀect of social
capital on N(a). Furthermore, one can argue that police intensity is associated with a higher cost
of obtaining a gun, g.19 Given that the relationship between g and N(a) is inversely proportional,
the predicted eﬀect of police intensity on the per capita number of (gun-related) oﬀenses remains
negative. One might also hypothesize a negative relationship between the prevalence of illegal guns
and the probability of detection and/or deterrence,  . Intuitively, if a civilian observes a suspicious
activity or an act of violence, he or she is generally less likely to intervene the higher are chances of
encountering an armed felon. Yet, once again, given that   negatively eﬀects N(a), this alternative
channel would only reinforce our predictions.
Third, one can certainly envision arguments for why the above-mentioned explanatory factors
may aﬀect N(a) in the opposite direction to the one predicted by equation (12). For instance, one
can argue that a higher level of social capital increases trust among felons, advances the emergence
of criminal networks, and, therefore, increases gun violence in a given region. We take these (and
other) objections seriously and include proxies for criminal networks, organized crime, as well as a
wide range of alternative explanatory factors into our regressions. On balance, we believe that our
theoretical model provides a helpful roadmap for the directionality of the eﬀects and proceed with
the empirical analysis.
3 Empirical Implementation
The structure of our empirical investigation is as follows. In section 3.1, we study in a cross-
section of counties conditional correlations between the per capita number of oﬀenses and the key
explanatory variables – illegal guns, social capital, and police intensity. To come closer towards
a causal inference of these eﬀects, we turn to panel data analysis in section 3.2. In each section,
the main focus lies on studying the determinants of gun-related oﬀenses, i.e., testing Proposition
1. However, we also consider the eﬀects of illegal guns, social capital, and police intensity on total
(i.e., armed and unarmed) oﬀenses, as suggested by our Proposition 2.
19 Cook et al. (2015) provide some anecdotal evidence for this claim.
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3.1 Cross-Section Analysis
3.1.1 Data and Econometric Specification
Our primary source of information on (gun-related) crime in the U.S. is the Uniform Crime Reporting
(UCR) data by the United States Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
This database provides detailed information on crime known to the police, collected from more
than 18,000 local law enforcement agencies (LEAs). With more than 90% of counties represented
in the database, UCR meets fairly well its goal of providing an overall view of criminal activities
in the U.S.20 Due to the fact that this database is publicly available, it has become the workhorse
tool in empirical studies of crime, see, e.g., Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), Duggan (2001), Cook
and Ludwig (2006), Cook et al. (2007).21 In the following, we provide a brief description of the
key variables of interest and relegate the detailed discussion of the (step-by-step) construction of
these variables to the Online Appendix D. Summary statistics for the main estimation samples are
provided in Table A.1.
The UCR database is structured under the following four key categories: (a) Oﬀenses Known and
Clearances by Arrest (OKCA), (b) Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), (c) Law Enforcement
Oﬃcers Killed or Assaulted (LEOKA), and (d) Property Stolen and Recovered (PSR). We use the
first two datasets to construct our dependent variables and draw a range of right-hand side variables
from the latter ones. All four datasets are available on an annual basis for the period 1986-2014. We
exploit the entire timespan in the panel analysis and consider annual averages over the period 2000-
2010 in the cross-section. Using the correspondence provided by the U.S. Department of Justice,
we map the LEA-level data to individual counties – the unit of observation in our analysis.22
At the highest level of abstraction, the issue of gun violence has two dimensions – non-lethal
and lethal. We approximate the former aspect using information on gun-related robberies from the
UCR’s OKCA database. More specifically, we take (the log of) the per capita number of gun-related
robberies in a given county as our first key dependent variable (henceforth, GunRobberies). This
outcome variable is well-suited for the analysis of the predictions of our economic model of crime.23
Using OKCA, we further construct a measure of TotalRobberies, defined as the per capita number
of total (i.e., armed and unarmed) robberies in a given county.
To capture the second, lethal dimension of gun violence, we use UCR’s SHR data. This database
reports, among other things, the type of weapon and the circumstance under which a homicide was
committed. During the construction of our baseline measure of homicides, we exclude all circum-
stances indicating an accident (such as ‘gun cleaning’, ‘child playing with gun’, etc.), negligence
(e.g., ‘child killed by babysitter’), or law enforcement killings (‘felon killed by police’, ‘suspected
20 Due to diverging data collection methodologies, information for Florida, Illinois (except for Cook county,
Chicago), and a few individual counties from other U.S. states is oftentimes missing, see Fig. 1 and 2.
21 See, however, Maltz (1999) for a detailed discussion of the limitations of this data. We summarize the main
caveats of the UCR data further below and suggest adequate empirical strategies to account for these limitations.
22 We choose a slightly higher level of aggregation due to unavailability of control variables at the LEA-level.
23 Information on usage of guns in other ‘economic’ oﬀenses (such as burglary or larceny) is unavailable.
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felony’, etc.).24 We then calculate the (log of the) per capita number of firearm-caused homicide
incidents in a given county (henceforth, GunHomicides) and the (log of the) per capita number of
total homicide incidents (henceforth, TotalHomicides).25 To be clear, our theoretical framework
does not explicitly encompass (gun-caused) homicides. Yet, one can envision a simple extension of
the model in which a gun-related robbery results in the (probabilistic) discharge of the firearm. In
such a model, the number of (gun-caused) homicides in a given county would be a positive function
of illegal guns and a negative function of social capital and police intensity. However, due to the
fact that, in reality, some murders are committed by ordinary citizens for non-economic reasons
(such as hatred and animosity), we expect a weaker eﬀect of factors such as probability of detection
or the prevalence of illegal guns on (gun-caused) homicides compared to (gun-related) robberies.
Our baseline econometric specification for the cross-section of counties (c) reads:
N(a)c =  1IllegalGunsc +  2SocialCapitalc +  3PoliceIntensityc +  Xc + ⇢s + "c, (13)
whereby N(a)c 2 {GunRobberiesc,GunHomicidesc,TotalRobberiesc,TotalHomicidesc} is the (log of
the) average per capita number of a given oﬀense type in 2000-2010, Xc is a vector of county-level
controls, ⇢s denotes state fixed eﬀects, and "c is the error term.26 Our theoretical model predicts a
positive estimate  ˆ1 > 0, and negative estimates  ˆ2 < 0 and  ˆ3 < 0, see equation (12).
We suggest a novel measure for the number of illegal guns based on gun thefts reported in the
UCR’s PSR database. More specifically, we utilize the annual information on the value of firearms
stolen in a given county and take (the log of) the average value in 2000-2010 as our cross-sectional
proxy for the prevalence of IllegalGuns. Unfortunately, this database does not provide information
on the quantity or type of stolen guns. However, it is known from the National Crime Victimization
Survey that the vast majority of stolen guns are handguns, see Langton (2012) and Zawitz (1995).
Given that the price range for revolvers and pistols is fairly narrow, we believe that our value-based
measure provides a good approximation for the number of illegal guns.
We approximate the level of social capital with the associational density, calculated using an-
nual data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) for the period 1986-2014.
More specifically, we draw from the CBP information on the number of and employment by “reli-
gious, grantmaking, civic, professional, and similar organizations”, classified according to the 813
code of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).27 Examples of establishments
falling into this category are community and ethnic organizations, parent-teacher associations, hu-
man rights organizations, religious and charitable organizations. More than 80% of employment
associated with the NAICS code 813 is accounted for by the two more narrowly defined NAICS
24 See Online Data Appendix D for the full list of excluded categories.
25 A homicide incident is an event in which one or more persons are killed at the same place and time. Measures
of GunHomicides and TotalHomicides based on the victim count yield similar results, available upon request.
26 To simplify the notation, we drop the county-subscript c henceforth.
27 In 1998, the CBP changed the industry classification from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS), whereby religious, social, and civic organizations were clas-
sified under the SIC code “86” in the period 1986-1997.
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codes: 8131 (“religious organizations”) and 8134 (“social and civic organizations”). Since informa-
tion on the NAICS code 813 is available for a larger number of counties, we use it for the construction
of our baseline proxy, but consider the two more disaggregated codes in the robustness checks. We
construct four alternative measures of SocialCapital (all expressed in terms of natural logarithms):
(i) employment by the organizations classified under the NAICS code 813 over the total employ-
ment in a given a county, (ii) employment by the organizations classified under the NAICS code
813 per capita, (iii) the number of establishments classified under the NAICS code 813 over the
total number of establishments in a given county, (iv) the number establishments classified under
the NAICS code 813 per capita. We use the first measure as our baseline proxy for social capital
and consider the other three measures in the robustness checks. The idea behind approximating
social capital with the associational density builds on seminal contributions by Putnam (1993, 1995,
2000), who shows that participation in associational activities boosts interaction and cooperation
between community members and promotes the norms of reciprocity and trust. The advantage of
our measure compared to alternative proxies suggested in the literature (such as voluntary blood
donations or voter turnouts) is that it exploits oﬃcial data from the U.S. Census and is therefore
characterized by a high degree of validity and consistency. Moreover, suitably for the ensuing panel
data analysis, this measure is available on an annual basis for the vast majority of U.S. counties over
the entire period of 1986-2014. In the cross-sectional analysis, we take the (log of the) associational
employment density averaged over 2000-2010 as our measure of SocialCapital.
Information on police intensity is drawn from the UCR’s LEOKA database. For each LEA, the
LEOKA database reports, among other things, the number of police oﬃcers and police employees
per 1,000 population. To construct our baseline measure of police intensity, we calculate for each
year the weighted average of the police oﬃcers rate across all LEAs of a given county with weights
being the fraction of a county’s population served by a given LEA.28 In the cross-sectional analysis,
we take (the log of) the police oﬃcers rate averaged over 2000-2010 as our proxy for PoliceIntensity.
The choice of variables for the vector of controls is motivated by our theoretical model, the
public debate on this issue, and related empirical findings. Our model suggests that the per capita
number of (gun-related) oﬀenses depends positively on the wage rate of law-abiding citizens w. As
a proxy for w, we use (the log of) a county’s per capita Income averaged over 2000-2010, collected
from the U.S. Census’ Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) database.29 Poverty may
force citizens into illegal behavior and, potentially, compel them to acquire guns in order to raise
the associated booty. To account for this potential confounding factor, we draw from the SAIPE
database information on the percentage of a county’s population living below the poverty line and
take (the log of) this value averaged over 2000-2010 as a measure of Poverty. We further control for
IncomeInequality, measured as (the log of) a county’s Gini coeﬃcient, as reported by the 2006-2010
28 The reason for using weighted averages derives from the fact that some small LEAs may have high police oﬃcers
rates due to the surveillance of correctional facilities, and simple averages would potentially overstate the police
intensity in a given county. However, the results are very similar when we consider non-weighted averages.
29 This data is drawn on an annual basis from https://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/statecounty/data/.
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American Community Survey (ACS).
To control for the overall level of crime, we draw from the UCR’s OKCA information on the total
number of oﬀenses across all crime categories and take (the log of) this per capita number averaged
over 2000-2010 as our measure of CrimeRate. As mentioned in the previous section, one might be
concerned that the level of social capital merely reflects the prevalence of criminal networks and
organized crime. To account for this alternative explanation, we construct the following two control
variables using the UCR’s SHR data. OrganizedCrime is calculated as (the log of 0.001 plus) the
average share of ‘gangland killings’ and ‘juvenile gang killings’ in the total number of homicide
incidents by county in 2000-2010. CriminalNetworks is constructed as (the log of 0.001 plus) the
average share of homicides committed by more than one person in total homicides in 2000-2010.
Several recent contributions suggest a positive link between a society’s fractionalization and con-
flict, see, e.g., Arbatli et al. (2015) and reference therein. This relationship might be particularly
pronounced in one of the most diverse countries in the world – the United States. We consider
two diﬀerent measures of fractionalization – ethnic (EthnicFrac) and racial (RacialFrac). The for-
mer measure is constructed as follows. Using 2006-2010 ACS information on the country of birth
of the foreign-born U.S. population, we calculate for each county the share s of ethnic group e
stemming from one of the 108 distinct countries of origin. We then aggregate these shares to a
Herfindahl index, EthnicFrac = ln
⇣
1 PEi=e s2i⌘, whereby higher values of this index represent
a higher ethnic fractionalization in a given county.30 To construct a measure of racial fraction-
alization, we exploit information from the 2010 U.S. Decennial Census on the number of citizens
belonging to one of the following six racial groups (r): ‘Black or African American’, ‘White Amer-
ican’, ‘Hispanics’, ‘American Indian or Native Alaskan American’, ‘Asian American’ and ‘Native
Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander’. More specifically, we calculate for each county the share (s)
of a racial group (r) in a county’s population and aggregate these shares to a Herfindahl index,
RacialFrac = ln
⇣
1 PRi=r s2i⌘, whereby higher values of this index represent a higher racial frac-
tionalization in a given county. We also include the (log of the) percentage of AfricanAmerican
population in a given county as an additional control variable and verify that our results are robust
to controlling for the prevalences of other racial groups.
To account for a possible eﬀect of educational attainment on the willingness of individuals to
commit a (gun-related) oﬀense, we control for Education, constructed as the (log of the) percentage
of over-25 years old citizens with at least a high school degree, as reported by the 2006-2010 ACS.
To control for the potential impact of urbanization on the costs of obtaining a gun (g) and the
probability of detection ( ), we draw from the 2010 U.S. Census Urban and Rural Classification
information on the fraction of a county’s population living in urban areas and take the log of this
variable as our measure of Urbanization. We further control for the (log of the) percentage of
children (6-17 years old) living in a SingleParent household, drawn from the 2006-2010 ACS.
30 In using the Herfindahl method to construct a measure of fractionalization, we follow Alesina et al. (2003) and
Fearon (2003). Our results are virtually unchanged if we capture fractionalization using standard deviations.
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Administrative information on legal gun ownership at the county level is, unfortunately, un-
available. Azrael et al. (2004) and Cook and Ludwig (2006) approximate the access to guns with
the percentage of suicides committed with a firearm. The idea behind this measure is that, if the
willingness to commit a suicide is equally distributed across regions, a higher fraction of firearm
suicides in total suicides reveals a higher gun ownership in a given region. Following this approach,
we use data on suicides from the Center for Disease and Control Prevention (CDC) to control for
LegalGuns, constructed as the (log of the) share of suicides committed with a firearm in 2004-2010.31
Recall from the previous section that the number of (gun-related) oﬀenses depends negatively
on the penalty rate, p. Given that the responsibility for criminal law and criminal justice in the
U.S. is shared between the federal and state governments, we control for state-specific diﬀerences
in criminal laws using state fixed eﬀects, included in all regressions.
3.1.2 OLS Estimations
Table 1 reports the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions specified in equation (13)
with GunRobberies as a dependent variable. As can be seen from columns (1) and (2), GunRob-
beries are positively correlated with the number of IllegalGuns and negatively correlated with the
level of SocialCapital, respectively. The coeﬃcient of PoliceIntensity in column (3) is negative but
not significant. However, it becomes significant after controlling for a county’s per capita income,
poverty rate and income inequality in column (4). All three key explanatory variables – illegal guns,
social capital, and police intensity – remain fairly robust in size and significance after including a
range of additional control variables in columns (5)-(7). In line with the model’s predictions, Gun-
Robberies are positively correlated with the number of IllegalGuns and negatively correlated with
SocialCapital and PoliceIntensity. The number of gun robberies per capita also tends to be higher in
richer and more unequal counties, which have a high (organized) crime rate and a strong prevalence
criminal networks, are racially fragmented, and have a high fraction of African American population
and single-parent households. In contrast, counties with a high level of urbanization and education
seem to have a lower number of gun robberies per capita. The coeﬃcient of determination in our
preferred specification in column (7) suggests that our main explanatory variables, the extensive list
of controls, and state fixed eﬀects jointly explain about two-thirds of the cross-sectional variation
in gun-related robberies in the U.S. In column (8), we further control for the prevalence of legal
guns, which reduces our sample by half. All three key explanatory variables remain robust and
highly significant. The positive coeﬃcient of LegalGuns suggests that the number of per capita gun
robberies is higher in counties with a higher prevalence of legal guns.
Next, we rerun the above-mentioned regressions using GunHomicides as a dependent variable,
see Table A.2 in Appendix. Throughout specifications, GunHomicides are positively and highly
31 This data is drawn from https://wisqars.cdc.gov:8443/cdcMapFramework/. We also verify that our results
are robust to controlling for subscriptions to Guns&Ammo magazine – an alternative proxy for gun prevalence
suggested by Duggan (2001). Given that information on Guns&Ammo subscriptions is available only for a small
subset of counties, we do not include this proxy in our baseline regressions but provide the results upon request.
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Table 1. Cross-section estimates: Correlates of gun robberies.
Dep.variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)GunRobberies
IllegalGuns 0.226*** 0.255*** 0.266*** 0.198*** 0.054** 0.081*** 0.058*** 0.072***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025)
SocialCapital -0.164*** -0.163*** -0.126*** -0.136*** -0.162*** -0.134*** -0.149***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035)
PoliceIntensity -0.036 -0.075*** -0.051** -0.067*** -0.051*** -0.070***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Income -0.122*** 0.082*** 0.153*** 0.096*** -0.205***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.038)
Poverty 0.424*** 0.176*** 0.086* 0.068 -0.125*
(0.055) (0.050) (0.048) (0.060) (0.073)
Inequality 1.499*** 1.196*** 1.062*** 0.643*** 0.395
(0.239) (0.221) (0.207) (0.221) (0.276)
CrimeRate 0.560*** 0.437*** 0.517*** 0.678***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.045)
OrganizedCrime 0.157*** 0.142*** 0.129*** 0.065***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
CriminalNetworks 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.012*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
EthnicFrac 0.007 -0.013 -0.013
(0.035) (0.034) (0.049)
RacialFrac 0.112*** 0.085** 0.072
(0.036) (0.036) (0.046)
AfricanAmerican 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.303***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
Education -0.370*** -0.269**
(0.094) (0.113)
Urbanization -0.048*** -0.046***
(0.004) (0.011)
SingleParent 0.140** 0.659***
(0.061) (0.089)
LegalGuns 0.139**
(0.055)
Observations 2,499 2,479 2,477 2,477 2,284 2,264 2,264 1,221
R-squared 0.344 0.366 0.369 0.423 0.575 0.642 0.663 0.860
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (13) with GunRobberies as a dependent variable. All specifications in-
clude state fixed eﬀects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level,
respectively.
significantly correlated with the number of IllegalGuns. Apart from column (8), in which the sample
is reduced by half, the negative coeﬃcient of SocialCapital is also highly significant. The coeﬃcient
of PoliceIntensity is throughout negative but not significant after including the full set of controls.
The lack of significance can be rationalized by the above-mentioned fact that homicide crimes are
oftentimes perpetrated “in the heat of moment” and may not be aﬀected by the probability of
detection. The coeﬃcients of control variables are comparable to the ones reported in Table 1.
Having explored the correlates ofGunRobberies andGunHomicides, we now rerun our regressions
using TotalRobberies and TotalHomicides as dependent variables. Table 2 presents the results of
our preferred specification with state fixed eﬀects and the full set of controls from column (7) of
Table 1.32 In line with our theoretical predictions, per capita robberies and homicides are positively
correlated with IllegalGuns and negatively associated with SocialCapital and PoliceIntensity.
32 Since the estimates of control variables are similar to the ones from Table 1, we do not report them for brevity.
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Table 2. Cross-section estimates: Correlates of total rob-
beries and total homicides.
Dependent variable
TotalRobberies TotalHomicides
IllegalGuns 0.034* 0.178***
(0.018) (0.019)
SocialCapital -0.079*** -0.041**
(0.020) (0.021)
PoliceIntensity -0.027* -0.005
(0.016) (0.017)
Observations 2,383 2,448
R-squared 0.868 0.619
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (13) with
TotalRobberies and TotalHomicides as dependent vari-
ables. All specifications include state fixed eﬀects and full
set of controls from column (7) of Table 1. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance
at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
In summary, the evidence presented so far is generally consistent with our theoretical predictions:
The number of (gun-related) oﬀenses is positively associated with the number of illegal guns and
negatively related to the level of social capital and police intensity in a given county. Yet, these
conditional correlations should not be interpreted as indicative of causal relationships for two main
reasons. First, even though we control for a wide range of alternative explanations and state fixed
eﬀects, there may be other (unobservable) county-specific factors that confound this relationship.
For instance, the historical incidence of slavery in a given county might explain both a low level
of social capital (see Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)) and a high prevalence of gun-related crime.
Second, the results presented above are prone to the issue of reverse causality. Consider for instance
the link between illegal guns and gun violence. It is possible that criminals seize a gun from an
armed victim in the course of a firearm oﬀense, making gun thefts merely a ‘byproduct’ of gun-
related oﬀenses. Moreover, criminals may undertake armed oﬀenses in order to steal additional guns,
in which case a high prevalence of gun thefts is the outcome (rather than the source) of frequent
firearm oﬀenses. Likewise, a low level of social capital may be both the cause and the outcome of
gun violence: Individuals in counties with a low level of trust may be more likely to pull the trigger,
but the level of social capital itself may deteriorate due to frequent firearm oﬀenses. Lastly, police
intensity is likely to increase as (gun-related) oﬀenses in a given region become more frequent. This
type of endogeneity works against the predicted negative eﬀect of police intensity and might provide
a further potential explanation behind the weak statistical significance of PoliceIntensity in Tables
2 and A.2.
To address the concerns related to the omitted variable bias and reverse causality, we turn to
panel data analysis. This approach allows us to account for unobservable time-invariant character-
istics of a county using county fixed eﬀects. Moreover, by exploiting time-lagged variation in illegal
guns, social capital, and police intensity we move closer towards a causal inference.
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3.2 Panel Data Analysis
The baseline econometric specification in this section takes the following form:
N(a)ct =  1IllegalGunsc,t 1+ 2SocialCapitalc,t 1+ 3PoliceIntensityc,t 1+⇢c+⇢st+ Xct+"ct, (14)
where N(a)ct 2 {GunRobberiesct,GunHomicidesct,TotalRobberiesct,TotalHomicidesct} in county c
and year t, and IllegalGunsc,t 1, SocialCapital c,t 1, and PoliceIntensityc,t 1 capture, respectively,
illegal guns, associational density, and police intensity from the previous period t 1.33 We conduct
our analysis for the period 1986-2014, whereby the starting year of the panel is determined by
the availability of data on the associational density from the CBP. County-specific fixed eﬀects ⇢c
account for time-invariant characteristics of a county (such as geography or history) as well as factors
that are relatively stable over time (e.g., urbanization). Year fixed eﬀects ⇢t control for aggregate
time-specific shocks. In an even more stringent specification, we include state-year fixed eﬀects ⇢st,
which eﬀectively control for all time-varying state-specific factors, such as gun legislation or criminal
laws. Our vector of time-varying county-level controls, Xct includes CrimeRatect, Incomect, and
Povertyct, whereby all variables are defined by analogy to section 3.1.1.34 In all regressions, standard
errors are clustered at the county level to adjust for within-county correlation over time. To simplify
the notation, we drop the county-subscript c henceforth.
Table 3 reports the panel estimates from equation (14) with GunRobberiest as a dependent
variable. The eﬀects of the key explanatory factors are in line with our theoretical predictions:
Smaller number of gun thefts (IllegalGunst 1), higher associational density (SocialCapital t 1), and
higher police intensity (PoliceIntensity t 1) in period t  1 are associated with lower gun robberies
in period t. As can be seen from column (3), these eﬀects are robust to controlling for crime rate,
per capita income and poverty in a given period.35 The sign of the coeﬃcients of control variables
can be well rationalized in terms of our theoretical model. If one were to interpret the crime rate
in a given county as a measure for this county’s criminal inclination (the inverse of the parameter
 in the model), the negative coeﬃcient of CrimeRatet is in line with our Proposition 1(ii). The
positive coeﬃcient of Incomet is consistent with the positive eﬀect of w on Na predicted by our
model. Lastly, the positive coeﬃcient of Poverty t suggests that poverty may force citizens into
illegal behavior and, potentially, compel them to acquire guns in order to raise the associated booty
(parameter   > 1 in our model). Controlling for state-year (rather than year) fixed eﬀects in column
(4), slightly reduces the size of the coeﬃcients of control variables but leaves the estimates of our
key explanatory variables virtually unchanged.
33 All variables are defined as in section 3.1.1, apart from GunHomicidesct and TotalHomicidesct, which are con-
structed as ln(0.001+per capita number of armed oﬀenses) and ln(0.001+per capita number of total oﬀenses),
respectively. The reason for adding a small constant (0.001) lies in the fact that most counties feature zero (gun-
related) homicides in a given year and these observations would be omitted in the logarithmic specification.
34 Data on CrimeRatect in 1993 is missing in the UCR database. In our baseline analysis, we replace CrimeRatec1993
by an average of CrimeRatec1992 and CrimeRatec1994. Our results are robust to dropping this year.
35 Our results are fairly unchanged if we include lagged values of the control variables into the regressions.
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Table 3. Panel estimates: Gun robberies.
Dep.variable: OLS WLS
GunRobberiest (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IllegalGunst 1 0.090*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.030***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
SocialCapital t 1 -0.042*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.071*** -0.048*** -0.051***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
PoliceIntensityt 1 -0.084*** -0.090*** -0.092*** -0.073*** -0.068***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
CrimeRatet 0.607*** 0.600*** 0.579*** 0.601*** 0.562***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Incomet 0.235*** 0.170*** 0.245*** 0.264***
(0.052) (0.056) (0.062) (0.062)
Povertyt 0.227*** 0.174*** 0.101** 0.106**
(0.038) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044)
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes no no no
State-year FE no no no yes yes yes
IMR no no no no yes yes
Observations 43,009 42,907 42,773 42,761 40,268 40,268
R-squared 0.766 0.784 0.785 0.800 0.799 0.804
Note: The table reports panel estimates of (variations of) equation (14) with GunRobberiest as a
dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. IMR represents
inverse Mills ratios. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
Before introducing the robustness checks from columns (5) and (6), it is worth pausing to briefly
discuss the limitations of the UCR data (see Maltz (1999) for a detailed discussion). The main
caveat of the UCR panel data is its unbalanced nature. For instance, consecutive observations on
GunRobberies for the period 1986-2014 are available only for one-third of the counties. The reason
for missing values is twofold. First, states may have oﬀense definitions that are incompatible with
UCR definitions, leading to data being submitted but not accepted.36 Second, some law enforcement
agencies (LEAs) may withdraw from the UCR program for a certain period of time. If LEAs
discontinue reporting to the UCR due to factors related to the explanatory variables, our estimates
presented so far may be prone to the sample selection bias. To account for this potential bias, one
has to bear in mind two possible ways through with non-reporting by LEAs can manifest itself in
our county-level analysis. First, if none of the LEAs in a given county submits reports to the UCR
in a given year, information on gun-related oﬀenses in this county-year is missing. Second, if some
of the LEAs of a given county fail to submit their reports to the UCR, our measure of gun-related
oﬀenses – constructed as the sum of gun-related oﬀenses across all reporting LEAs – understates the
actual prevalence of gun violence in this county. We deal with the above-mentioned data limitations
by implementing the following two adjustments of our baseline empirical specification.
First, we correct for a potential sample selection bias due to missing county-year observations
by testing the sample selection model, cf. Wooldridge (2010). More specifically, for each year in
the period 1986-2014, we estimate the following Probit model: Pr(y = 1|x) =  (x ), whereby
36 For instance, complete data for Illinois have not been included in the UCR since 1985 because the Illinois
statutory definition of sexual assault is inconsistent with the UCR definition of rape.
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the binary dependent variable y is equal to one if GunRobberiest in a given county is positive and
zero otherwise, and x is a vector of controls containing state fixed eﬀects and the following list of
county-level variables. To account for the fact that non-reporting to the UCR is most pronounced for
smaller and rural counties (see Lynch and Jarvis (2008) and Maltz (1999)), we control for (the logs
of) a county’s population and per capita income in a given year, as well as the degree of urbanization
in 2000-2010.37 To account for the possibility that missing county-level observations might arise
due to a high level of crime in a given period, we further control for the (log of) per capita arrests in
a given year, constructed using UCR County-Level Detailed Arrest and Oﬀense Data.38 From these
Probit regressions, we obtain county-year-specific inverse Mills ratios (IMRs),  ˆct and include them,
as well as their interaction with year dummies, into our econometric specification from equation
(14). As can be seen from column (5) of Table 3, this robustness check does not materially aﬀect
the estimates of our key variables of interest.
Second, to account for potentially endogenous sampling of LEAs and to correct for heteroskedas-
ticity in county-year error terms, we rerun our regressions using weighted least squares (WLS), see
Solon et al. (2015). More specifically, we exploit UCR information on the number of citizens under
the jurisdiction of a given LEA to calculate for each county-year the fraction of population served
by reporting LEAs and use these population shares as weights in the WLS regressions. As can be
seen from column (6) of Table 3, the WLS estimates of our key explanatory variables remain highly
significant and are virtually unchanged in size compared to the OLS coeﬃcients. The estimates
from columns (4)-(6) suggest that a one percent decrease in illegal guns, a one percent increase
in social capital, or a one percent increase in police intensity in period t   1 decreases gun-related
robberies in period t by roughly 0.03, 0.05-0.07, and 0.07-0.09 percentage points, respectively.
Next, we rerun the regressions reported in Table 3 using GunHomicidest as a dependent variable.
As can be seen from column (3) of Table A.3, all three coeﬃcients of interest are in line with our
theoretical predictions and are highly significant, controlling for year and county fixed eﬀects, as
well as a county’s crime rate, per capita income, and poverty rate. However, the negative coeﬃcient
of PoliceIntensity t 1 loses significance after controlling for state-year (rather than year) fixed eﬀects
in column (4). In column (5), we correct for the potential sample selection bias by including inverse
Mills ratios (as well as their interaction with year dummies) into our specification. Following the
approach described above, we obtain these IMRs from the Probit model: Pr(y = 1|x) =  (x ),
whereby the binary dependent variable y is equal to one if GunHomicidest in a given county is
positive and zero otherwise, and x is a vector containing state fixed eﬀects and controls for a
county’s population, per capita income, urbanization, and per capita arrests. The coeﬃcients of
IllegalGunst 1 and SocialCapital t 1 remain highly robust (both in terms of size and significance) to
this sample selection correction, cf. column (5). Moreover, these estimates are virtually unchanged
if we rerun our regressions using WLS instead of OLS, cf. column (6) of Table A.3.
37 Yearly estimates of urbanization are, unfortunately, not available.
38 This data is drawn from https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/35019 and it is available for
almost entire set of counties in the period of 1986-2014.
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In what follows, we conduct further robustness checks of our econometric specification from
equation (14) using GunRobberiest as a dependent variable.39 Recall that our baseline measure of
social capital is constructed as the fraction of a county’s employment by religious, civic, and social
organizations (classified under the NAICS code 813) in the total employment of a given county.
In columns (1)-(5) of Table 4, we rerun regressions from column (4) of Table 3 using alternative
measures of SocialCapital. In columns (1) and (2), we zoom into this measure by considering the
fraction of a county’s workforce employed by religious organizations (NAICS code 8131), and by
civic and social organizations (NAICS code 8134), respectively.40 In contrast to the previously used
measures, constructed as the ratio of associational employment in total employment, the proxy for
social capital in column (3) is defined as the per capita employment by religious, civic, and social
organizations. Instead of employment-based proxies utilized so far, columns (4) and (5) consider two
establishment-based measures: The former is constructed as the ratio of NAICS 813 establishments
in the total number of establishments in a given county, while the latter is defined as the per capita
number of NAICS 813 establishments in a given county. Regardless of the employed definition, the
coeﬃcients of SocialCapital t 1 are negative and significant at least at the 5% level. In column (6) of
Table 4, we utilize an alternative definition of police intensity. Instead of measuring PoliceIntensity
as the per capita number of police oﬃcers, this column employs a broader proxy based on the
per capita number of police employees. The coeﬃcient of PoliceIntensity t 1 is negative, highly
significant, and comparable in size to the one reported in Table 3.
Table 4. Panel estimates: Gun robberies, alternative measures for explanatory variables.
Dep.variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)GunRobberiest
SocialCapital t 1 (empl., religious) -0.072***
(0.020)
SocialCapital t 1 (empl., social&civic) -0.024**
(0.011)
SocialCapital t 1 (empl., per capita) -0.061***
(0.015)
SocialCapital t 1 (est., ratio) -0.123***
(0.033)
SocialCapital t 1 (est., per capita) -0.138***
(0.031)
PoliceIntensityt 1 (employees) -0.084***
(0.024)
Observations 40,105 25,278 42,792 43,820 43,820 42,761
R-squared 0.808 0.856 0.800 0.797 0.797 0.800
Note: The table reports panel estimates of equation (14) with GunRobberiest as a dependent variable. All specifi-
cations include state-year and county fixed eﬀects, as well as the full set of covariates from Table 3. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the county level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
Next, we return to our baseline measures of social capital and police intensity but consider longer
39 We focus henceforth on GunRobberiest as a dependent variable since it is most suitable to test the predictions of
our theoretical model of economic crime. However, all robustness checks yield similar results for GunHomicidest
as an outcome variable.
40 In the period 1986-1997, religious organizations are classified by the CBP under the SIC code 866, while civic
and social organizations correspond to the SIC code 864.
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lags of the key explanatory variables. As can be seen from Table 3, IllegalGuns, SocialCapital, and
PoliceIntensity from period t   3 continue to have a significant eﬀect on GunRobberies in period
t. The significance of IllegalGuns and PoliceIntensity eventually vanishes as one increases the lags
to four or five years, yet SocialCapital continues to have a significant eﬀect on GunRobberiest even
after five years. The latter finding is in line with a large body of literature suggesting a long-lasting
impact of social capital on various socio-economic outcomes, cf., e.g., Algan and Cahuc (2010, 2014)
and Guiso et al. (2010).
Table 5. Panel estimates: Gun Robberies, longer lags.
Dep.variable: Lags
GunRobberiest n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
IllegalGunst n 0.025*** 0.012** 0.011* 0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
SocialCapital t n -0.039** -0.053*** -0.038** -0.033**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
PoliceIntensityt n -0.085*** -0.055** -0.030 -0.051*
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Observations 40,895 39,288 37,615 35,827
R-squared 0.803 0.807 0.810 0.814
Note: The table reports panel estimates of equation (14) with Gun-
Robberiest as a dependent variable. n = 2, ..., 5 represents the num-
ber of lagged periods. All specifications include state-year and county
fixed eﬀects, as well as the full set of controls from Table 3. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. *, **, ***
indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
In summary, we have established robust relationships between gun-related oﬀenses and lagged
values of gun thefts, social capital, and police intensity in line with our theoretical predictions.
Do these relationships allow for causal inference? Consider first the eﬀect of social capital. Since
it is unlikely that associational density in period t   n (n = 1, .., 5) increases in expectation of
lower gun robberies in period t, it is reasonable to assert that SocialCapital t n is exogenous to
GunRobberiest. The issue of reverse causality is potentially more pronounced in case of police
intensity since employment of police oﬃcers in a given year may be driven by the anticipation of
higher gun robberies in subsequent years. However, this potential endogeneity would introduce
a positive comovement of PoliceIntensity t n and GunRobberiest, which would work against the
predictions of our model. Thus, if we find a strong negative association between PoliceIntensity t n
and GunRobberiest in our estimates, the true eﬀect of police intensity may be even stronger. Lastly,
consider the eﬀect of gun thefts. Regressing GunRobberies on the lagged values of IllegalGuns,
we exclude the possibility that firearm thefts in a given period are merely a byproduct of firearm
oﬀenses in this period. However, the evidence presented so far does not yet imply a causal eﬀect
of illegal guns since criminals may steal a gun in a given year with an intention to use it at some
future time. In other words, IllegalGunst n may be endogenous to GunRobberiest. To account for
the potential issue of reverse causality, one needs a time-varying measure of illegal guns that is
exogenous to gun oﬀenses in a given county and year.
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We suggest that firearms stolen in neighboring states are likely to provide this sort of variation.
More specifically, to approximate the prevalence of illegal guns in year t and county c from state i,
we construct the following alternative county-level measure of
IllegalGunsAct ⌘ ln
0@X
j
IllegalGunsjt · `jc
1A , (15)
whereby IllegalGunsjt is the value of firearms stolen in state j 6= i adjacent (A) to state i, and `jc
denotes the likelihood that a stolen gun from state j reaches county c.
The idea behind this measure is illustrated in Figure 7, using Jeﬀerson county (c) from the
state of Pennsylvania (PA) as an example. According to tracing reports of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, among those guns that were originally purchased in a diﬀerent
state than the one in which they were recovered, the vast majority stems from contiguous states.41
Hence, county c from state i (PA) is likely to receive a fraction of guns stolen in adjacent states
j (in Fig. 7: Ohio (OH), West Virginia (WV), Virginia (VA), Maryland (MD), Delaware (DE),
New Jersey (NJ), and New York (NY)). Is this alternative measure of illegal guns exogenous to gun
oﬀenses in a given county? Clearly, a criminal from county c may steal a gun from a neighboring
state in period t 1 to conduct a firearm oﬀense in this county in period t. However, our identifying
assumption is that (the mass of criminals from) a single county is too small to drive the variation in
gun thefts across all adjacent states over time,
P
jIllegalGuns
j
t . We thus assert that IllegalGuns
A
c,t n
is plausibly exogenous to GunRobberiest. Nevertheless, we conduct a range of robustness checks to
preclude possible violations of our identifying assumption.
Figure 7. Illegal gun flows from contiguous states to a given county (c).
41 See, e.g., https://www.atf.gov/about/firearms-trace-data-2015.
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How do we approximate the likelihood of county c from state i to ‘import’ a stolen gun from a
contiguous state j? Since county-level tracing data are, to the best of our knowledge, unavailable, we
resort thereby to findings from state-level studies. In a recent contribution, Knight (2013) uses gun
tracing data for the year 2009 from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
to estimate the determinants of gun traﬃcking between states in a gravity-like setting.42 He finds
that distance between a pair of states decreases the likelihood of illegal gun imports from a given
source state, with the estimated elasticity of  0.514. For our county-level analysis, we calculate the
nearest distance between the borders of county c and state j, djc.43 Using data from Knight (2013),
we further calculate the share of guns sji , originally purchased in state j and recovered in state i, in
the nationwide amount of illegal guns traced back to state j. Arguably, a higher sji reflects a higher
likelihood of county c from state i to import an illegal gun from state j. Furthermore, Knight (2013)
shows that stricter gun regulations in a source state, as measured by a unit increase of the Mayors
Against Illegal Guns (2010) index (henceforth MAIG), reduce the likelihood of illegal gun ‘exports’
from this state by an average of  0.102.44 Based on this information, we construct for each county
the following score:
`jc ⌘ (MAIGj) 0.102 · sji · (djc) 0.514.
Figure 7 illustrates the logic behind this measure, using the afore-mentioned Jeﬀerson county (c).
Consider the volume of guns stolen in the Ohio (OH) state in year t, IllegalGunsOHt . These firearms
are less likely to be ‘exported’ to other states the stricter are gun laws in Ohio, MAIGOH . Among
those firearms that travel across state borders, fraction sOHPA goes to Pennsylvania, on average. Due
to the risk associated with transportation of illegal firearms, the amount of guns imported from Ohio
is less likely to reach a given county c, the higher distance between this county and OH, dOHc .45
Table 6 presents the results of the econometric specification from equation (14) with lagged
values of gun thefts in the contiguous states, IllegalGunsAt 1 as an additional explanatory variable.
As can be seen from column (1), IllegalGunsAt 1 has a positive and highly significant eﬀect on
GunRobberiest, controlling for state-year and county fixed eﬀects, as well as CrimeRatet, Incomet,
and Poverty t. Adding IllegalGunst 1, SocialCapital t 1, and PoliceIntensity t 1 in column (2), the
coeﬃcient of IllegalGunsAt 1 marginally decreases in size but remains significant at the 5% level. The
estimated elasticity of GunRobberiest with respect to IllegalGunsAt 1 suggests that a one percent
increase of gun thefts in adjacent states in the previous period increases a county’s gun robberies
in the current period by roughly 0.05 percentage points.
42 For a given destination state, these data report the number of guns recovered in 2009 from crime scenes that
were successfully traced to a given source state. Data for other calendar years are, unfortunately, unavailable.
43 Our results are fairly unchanged if we consider distance measures based on centroids (rather than borders).
44 This index varies between 0 and 10, whereby each point represents one the following ten gun regula-
tions: ‘Straw purchase liability’, ‘Falsifying purchaser information liability’, ‘Background check failure liabil-
ity’, ‘Gun show checks’, ‘Required purchaser permit’, ‘Local discretion to deny carry permits’, ‘Misdemeanor re-
strictions’, ‘Required reporting of lost or stolen guns’, ‘Local discretion over gun regulations’, ‘Dealer inspections’.
45 Our definition of `jc does not include gun regulations specific solely to the recipient state since they do not aﬀect
the elasticity estimates in our log-log specification. However, we verify that our results are robust to constructing
the `jc measure based on bilateral diﬀerences in gun laws across states.
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Table 6. Panel estimates: Gun robberies, illegal guns from adjacent states.
Full sample Exclude 10% of counties with the largest Excl. all
Dep.variable: Population CrimeRate Urbanization Income above
GunRobberiest (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IllegalGunsAt 1 0.059*** 0.050** 0.056** 0.046** 0.056*** 0.052** 0.056**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023)
IllegalGunst 1 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
SocialCapital t 1 -0.072*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.057***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
PoliceIntensityt 1 -0.086*** -0.071*** -0.075*** -0.064** -0.090*** -0.062**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Observations 56,131 42,397 35,346 35,913 35,924 41,595 30,117
R-squared 0.783 0.800 0.750 0.752 0.755 0.802 0.723
Note: The table reports panel estimates of equation (14) with GunRobberiest as a dependent variable. IllegalGunsAt 1
is defined in equation (15). All specifications include state-year and county fixed eﬀects, as well as the full set of
controls from Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. *, **, *** indicate significance
at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
Our identification strategy regarding the eﬀect of IllegalGunsAt 1 is built upon the assumption
that an individual county is too small to drive the (lagged) variation in gun thefts across all adjacent
states over time. Although this condition is likely to hold in general, one cannot rule out the
existence of a few counties that violate our identifying assumption. Arguably, these are populous
counties with a high degree of criminal activity, urbanization, and per capita income for which the
identifying assumption may not be fulfilled. In columns (3)-(7), we conduct a range of robustness
checks to ensure that our results are not driven by those counties. More specifically, in column
(3), we exclude the top decile of counties with the largest population.46 In column (4), we exclude
the top decile of counties with the highest CrimeRate. In column (5), we exclude the top decile
of counties with the largest degree of Urbanization. To ensure that a high level of potential booty
in a given county does not attract armed criminals from the neighboring states, we exclude the
top decile of counties with the highest per capita Income in column (6). Finally, in column (7),
we exclude all of the above. Throughout specifications, the coeﬃcient of IllegalGunsAt 1 remains
positive and significant. In summary, the evidence presented above suggests that a higher number
of illegal guns in a given period (originating either from a given county or from adjacent states) has
a robust positive eﬀect on a county’s gun robberies in the subsequent period.
Having explored the causes of gun-related oﬀenses, we now rerun our baseline regressions us-
ing TotalRobberiest and TotalHomicidest as dependent variables. Table 7 reports the estimates of
equation (13) with state-year and county fixed eﬀects, as well as controls for CrimeRatet, Incomet,
and Poverty t. In line with our theoretical predictions, IllegalGunst 1 increases while SocialCapi-
tal t 1 and PoliceIntensity t 1 decrease TotalRobberiest. In case of TotalHomicidest, all coeﬃcients
have the predicted sign but only IllegalGunst 1 and SocialCapital t 1 are significant. Overall, the
evidence provides strong support for our theoretical predictions.
46 We verify that our results are robust to consideration of alternative thresholds.
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Table 7. Panel estimates: Total robberies and total homicides.
Dependent variable
TotalRobberiest TotalHomicidest
IllegalGunst 1 0.013*** 0.042***
(0.003) (0.009)
SocialCapital t 1 -0.025** -0.062**
(0.012) (0.029)
PoliceIntensityt 1 -0.102*** -0.068
(0.022) (0.056)
Observations 52,785 64,556
R-squared 0.850 0.426
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (13) with To-
talRobberiest and TotalHomicidest as dependent variables. All
specifications include state-year and county fixed eﬀects, as
well as the full set of controls from Table 3. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the county level. *, **, *** indi-
cate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
4 Policy Implications
To formulate policy implications of our work, it is instructive to recall the optimization problem of
an unarmed (u) and armed (a) criminal presented, respectively:
max
x
E(⇡u) = (1   )(xcw)↵    pux , max
x
E(⇡a) = (1   )( xcw)↵    pax  g. (16)
In what follows, we discuss a range of mechanisms that can be applied by policy makers to reduce
the number of gun-related, Na and total oﬀenses, N , given by equations (9) and (11), respectively.
Consider first the penalty rate p. While in our baseline model p was assumed to be the same
for armed and unarmed criminals (cf. equations (1) and (5)), policy makers can potentially impose
larger penalties for an armed crime, pa > pu, see equation (16). In fact, the clause of pa > pu is
already enshrined in the 18 U.S. Code §924(c) of the U.S. federal criminal law: “[...] any person
who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traﬃcking crime [...], uses or carries
a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the
punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug traﬃcking crime (i) be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and (iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.”47 Nevertheless, the implementation of this clause
constitutes a major challenge for legal authorities since a “few statutes have proven as enigmatic as
18 U.S. Code §924(c)”, cf. judge Gorsuch (2015). To illustrate the eﬀects of an introduction (and
implementation) of a higher gun-related penalty rate, let pa ⌘  pu, whereby   > 1 denotes an
increase in the punishment for any given oﬀense due to the fact that a criminal is armed. Figure 8
depicts the predicted eﬀect of an increase in   on the equilibrium sorting of criminals into armed
47 See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/924.
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and unarmed activities. A larger cutoﬀ ca – above which individuals engage in gun-related crime
– immediately implies a lower per capita number of gun-related oﬀenses, Na. It should be noted
that an increase in the punishment for a firearm-related crime,   is not a ‘free lunch’, since some
criminals – those with c 2 (ca, c0a) in Fig. 8 – may either switch from a gun-related to unarmed
oﬀenses or substitute guns with another types of weapon (such as knives, brass knuckles, etc.).
However, as long the ‘threatening eﬀect’ of these alternative weapons (parameter   in our model)
is smaller compared to guns, the number of oﬀenses conducted by those criminals will be smaller
(cf. equations (2) and (6)). Hence, the overall number of oﬀenses N is expected to decrease in  .
Moreover, given that these alternative weapons are associated with a significantly lower risk of a
fatal injury, it is reasonable to assert that the overall number of homicides will decrease due to an
increase in the firearm-related punishment  .
Figure 8. The eﬀect of an increase in gun-related penalties,  0 >  .
Second, and related, lawmakers should consider increasing the penalties for possessing and/or
carrying an illegal (loaded) gun, even if this gun has not yet been used in furtherance of a crime.
From a theoretical perspective, this sanction implies the same eﬀects as an increase in  , with an
additional benefit of the prevention of potential (lethal) crimes. Currently, penalties for an illegal
possession of firearms diﬀer widely across states.48 For instance, possession of a firearm without a
permit in the state of New York is punishable by up to one year in prison, a fine of up to $1,000,
or both.49 On the other side of the spectrum, illegal possession of firearms in Arkansas is generally
punishable by a fine of up to $500 and a jail sentence of up to 90 days (see Arkansas Statutes
§5-73). In view of substantial personal and social costs of illegal guns (Cook and Ludwig (2006)),
policy makers are urged to reconsider whether penalties like the latter constitute an appropriate
punishment for the possession of an illegal firearm.
48 See, e.g., https://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/2012-R-0345.htm.
49 Possession of a loaded firearm without a permit outside of a person’s home is punishable by up to 15 years
imprisonment, with a mandatory minimum of 3.5 years (see N.Y. Penal Law §§ 265.01, 265.03, 265.20).
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Our theoretical model predicts a negative eﬀect of the costs of obtaining a gun (g) on the per
capita number of armed (Na) and total (N) oﬀenses. Using the number of illegal guns as (an
inverse) proxy for the costs of obtaining a gun, our empirical analysis provides strong evidence for
these predictions. Before formulating recommendations concerning containment of illegal weapons,
it is worth pausing to delineate the pervasiveness of illegal guns in the U.S. According to the recent
report by the U.S. Department of Justice (Langton (2012)), roughly 1.4 million firearms (an annual
average of 232,400) were stolen during burglaries and other property crimes over the period of
2005-2010. At least 80% of these stolen firearms had not been recovered at the time the National
Crime Victimization Survey was conducted. Clearly, these numbers only provide a sense of the
lower bound of illegal guns in circulation, since a significant fraction of weapons enter the illegal
gun market via straw purchasing, falsifying purchaser information, failing to conduct background
checks, etc., see Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010). What can be done to increase a criminal’s
costs of obtaining an illegal gun, g? First, policy makers can increase g by targeting the major
source of illegal weapons – gun traﬃckers and illegal gun dealers. A negative incentive in the form
of higher penalties for the sale and transportation of illegal weapons might be a viable option in
this context. Second, one might also consider designing positive incentives (e.g., monetary rewards)
for whistle-blowers of illegal gun dealers. This mechanism is likely to decrease trust between sellers
and buyers of illegal firearms and, thereby, increase the costs of obtaining an illegal weapon. Third,
by tightening the laws on storage of legal weapons, policy makers may prevent some firearms from
being stolen and, thereby, reduce the number of illegal guns in circulation. A pioneering policy
recently established in the District of Columbia (D.C. Code Ann. §7-2507.02(a)) might serve as
an example in this context: “[...] each registrant should keep any firearm in his or her possession
unloaded and either disassembled or secured by a trigger lock, gun safe, locked box, or other secure
device”. Fourth, policy makers should consider introducing a nationwide law which would require
individual gun owners to report lost or stolen firearms to law enforcement agencies.50 This law
plays a crucial role in combatting straw purchasing since, if a straw buyer is identified through gun
tracing, such a requirement would prevent him from evading responsibility by claiming that the
crime gun was stolen from him in the first place.
Lastly, according to our model, gun violence can be reduced by decreasing criminal inclinations
in a given society. In view of our empirical findings of a robust negative eﬀect of associational
density (civic, social and religions organizations) on the prevalence of gun-related oﬀenses, govern-
mental support of associational activism may serve as a tool in combatting gun violence. Yet, a
close collaboration between policy makers, sociologists, and criminologists is required in developing
further concrete strategies for building social capital. Social programs like Cure Violence (Ceasefire-
Chicago) or Boston Gun Project (Operation Ceasefire) are suitable case studies in this context.51
50 In 2016, only 10 states and the District of Columbia have such regulations in place, see https://smartgunlaws
.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/gun-owner-responsibilities/reporting-lost-or-stolen-firearms/.
51 See Kennedy et al. (2001), Slutkin et al. (2015), and https://cureviolence.org/.
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The objective of these programs is to prevent shootings involving youth by changing social norms
and ‘codes of the street’ with the help of social workers specially trained for this goal. Several
evaluations of these projects report statistically significant reductions in gun-related killings and
provide anecdotal evidence for the change in gun-related social norms (such as using a gun to settle
a dispute) in program sites.52 Yet, further empirical assessments of these and other programs, as
well as further research on the matter of social capital accumulation, is needed to better understand
the eﬀect of social capital on gun violence.
5 Concluding Comments
We present a simple model of crime in which criminals decide whether to act unarmed or commit
firearm-related felonies. This model suggests that gun-related oﬀenses in a given county increase
with the number of illegal guns and decrease with social capital and police intensity. Combining
detailed panel data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation with various socioeconomic variables,
we find empirical support for these predictions. To identify the eﬀect of illegal guns, we explore
plausibly exogenous variation in illegal gun supplies due to gun thefts in adjacent states. The
evidence provided in this paper suggests that illegal guns increase while social capital and police
decrease firearm oﬀenses.
To approximate the number of illegal guns, this paper exploits variation in gun thefts. Clearly,
a firearm can only be stolen if it was acquired in the first place. Consideration of legal and illegal
guns in a unified framework and empirical implementation of its predictions will certainly enhance
our understanding of the issue of gun violence. Given that such an investigation would go beyond
the scope of the current paper, we relegate it to future research.
52 See Braga et al. (2001a,b), Braga and Pierce (2004), Butts et al. (2015), Delgado et al. (2015), Henry et al.
(2014), Skogan et al. (2008), Picard-Fritsche and Cerniglia (2013), and Webster et al. (2012).
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A Tables
Table A.1. Summary statistics for main estimation sample.
Variables N mean sd min max
Cross-section:
GunRobberies 2,264 -2.090 0.938 -4.685 1.508
IllegalGuns 2,264 9.753 1.298 5.345 15.732
SocialCapital 2,264 -3.831 0.553 -8.513 -2.267
PoliceIntensity 2,264 0.677 0.682 -2.501 3.813
Income 2,264 6.841 1.095 1.595 10.865
Poverty 2,264 2.627 0.391 1.043 3.661
IncomeInequality 2,264 -0.838 0.079 -1.082 -0.468
CrimeRate 2,264 3.461 0.568 0.087 5.418
OrganizedCrime 2,264 -6.097 2.063 -6.908 5.902
CriminalNetworks 2,264 -3.042 3.122 -6.908 4.754
EthnicFrac 2,264 -0.412 0.478 -4.044 0.000
RacialFrac 2,264 -1.496 0.792 -4.065 -0.349
AfricanAmerican 2,264 -3.398 1.586 -6.873 -0.171
EducationLevel 2,264 3.538 0.223 2.241 3.996
Urbanization 2,264 2.699 3.341 -6.908 4.605
SingleParent 2,264 -1.192 0.304 -2.873 -0.263
GunHomicides 2,222 -4.263 0.927 -7.136 -0.848
TotalRobberies 2,383 -1.610 1.276 -5.899 2.798
TotalHomicides 2,448 -3.761 0.832 -6.827 -0.489
LegalGuns 1,221 2.072 0.468 -0.429 3.452
Panel:
GunRobberies 42,761 -2.023 1.121 -5.599 3.168
IllegalGuns 42,761 9.910 1.899 0.000 17.113
SocialCapital 42,761 -3.807 0.438 -9.716 -1.646
PoliceIntensity 42,761 0.498 0.356 -2.520 3.121
CrimeRate 42,761 3.633 0.551 -1.029 6.183
Income 42,761 6.335 1.066 1.264 9.670
Poverty 42,761 2.648 0.431 0.531 4.045
SocialCapital (empl., religious) 40,105 -4.176 0.465 -8.223 -1.743
SocialCapital (empl., social&civic) 25,278 -5.724 0.784 -9.385 -3.076
SocialCapital (empl., per capita) 42,792 1.831 0.560 -3.855 4.255
SocialCapital (est., ratio) 43,820 -3.015 0.370 -5.892 -1.725
SocialCapital (est., per capita) 43,820 0.064 0.387 -2.928 1.723
PoliceIntensity (employees) 42,761 0.847 0.389 -2.146 4.139
GunHomicides 64,556 -5.346 1.864 -6.908 0.010
TotalRobberies 52,785 -1.256 1.158 -4.981 4.211
TotalHomicides 64,556 -4.766 2.011 -6.908 0.262
IllegalGunsA 42,397 11.646 1.282 3.006 16.452
Note: The table reports summary statistics for the main estimation samples used
in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, A.2, A.3
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Table A.2. Cross-section estimates: Correlates of gun homicides.
Dep.variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)GunHomicides
IllegalGuns 0.091*** 0.122*** 0.152*** 0.317*** 0.248*** 0.242*** 0.210*** 0.191***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.032)
SocialCapital -0.198*** -0.198*** -0.108*** -0.091*** -0.098*** -0.077*** -0.006
(0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.045)
PoliceIntensity -0.094*** -0.027 -0.012 -0.017 -0.008 -0.003
(0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
Income 0.219*** 0.457*** 0.475*** 0.382*** 0.137***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.049)
Poverty 0.876*** 0.747*** 0.695*** 0.552*** 0.366***
(0.057) (0.053) (0.054) (0.067) (0.093)
Inequality 1.095*** 0.808*** 0.758*** 0.734*** 0.863**
(0.248) (0.228) (0.228) (0.247) (0.353)
CrimeRate 0.191*** 0.172*** 0.257*** 0.445***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.058)
OrganizedCrime 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.119*** 0.075***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
CriminalNetworks 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.055***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
EthnicFrac -0.037 -0.051 -0.118*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.063)
RacialFrac -0.067* -0.053 -0.007
(0.040) (0.041) (0.059)
AfricanAmerican 0.128*** 0.114*** 0.161***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.029)
Education 0.047 0.220
(0.106) (0.145)
Urbanization -0.042*** -0.068***
(0.005) (0.014)
SingleParent 0.168** 0.423***
(0.067) (0.115)
LegalGuns 0.270***
(0.070)
Observations 2,263 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,222 2,222 1,206
R-squared 0.318 0.337 0.342 0.458 0.547 0.561 0.578 0.722
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (13) with GunHomicides as a dependent variable. All specifications
include state fixed eﬀects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level,
respectively.
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Table A.3. Panel estimates: Gun homicides.
Dep.variable: OLS WLS
GunHomicidest (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IllegalGunst 1 0.072*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.041***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
SocialCapital t 1 -0.160*** -0.181*** -0.182*** -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.079***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
PoliceIntensityt 1 -0.134*** -0.138*** -0.047 -0.065 -0.045
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054)
CrimeRatet 0.328*** 0.325*** 0.355*** 0.346*** 0.321***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026)
Incomet 0.341*** -0.057 0.270** 0.314***
(0.083) (0.088) (0.105) (0.105)
Povertyt 0.350*** 0.112 0.075 0.094
(0.066) (0.076) (0.080) (0.080)
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes no no no
State-year FE no no no yes yes yes
IMR no no no no yes yes
Observations 65,806 64,748 64,574 64,556 62,499 62,499
R-squared 0.389 0.393 0.394 0.425 0.419 0.423
Note: The table reports panel estimates of equation (14) with GunHomicidest as a dependent
variable. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. IMR represents inverse
Mills ratios. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
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B Mathematical Appendix
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider first the proof of parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition 1. Taking the first-order derivative of
(9) with respect to g yields N 0a(g) =  c0a(g)xa(ca)f(ca) < 0, whereby the sign of this derivative
follows immediately from the fact that c0a(g) > 0. Similarly, diﬀerentiating (9) with respect to  , we
obtain N 0a( ) =  c0a( )xa(ca)f(ca) +
R 1
ca
x0a( )f(c)dc < 0, whereby the sign of this derivative results
from c0a( ) > 0 and x0a( ) < 0, cf. equations (8) and (9).
Consider next the proof of Proposition 1(ii). Plugging the density associated with the cumulative
distribution function from equation (10) in (9) and integrating the resulting expression, we obtain
Na =
cmin
1  cmin
1  ↵
↵  (1  ↵)
✓
1  (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵
◆
( w)
↵
1 ↵
✓
1   
 
↵
p
◆ 1
1 ↵
. (B.1)
Diﬀerentiating Na from equation (B.1) with respect to  yields after simplification:
N 0a() =  
cmin(1  ↵)( w)
↵
1 ↵
⇣
1  
 
↵
p
⌘ 1
1 ↵
((1 + )↵  )2(1  cmin)2
·X,
whereby
X ⌘ (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵ ((↵  (1  ↵))(ln(cmin)  (1  cmin) ln(ca)) + ↵(1  cmin))  ↵(1  cmin)
  ln(cmin)(↵  (1  ↵)).
Note that N 0a()  0 if and only if X   0. To assess the sign of X, we take the first-order derivative
of X with respect to cmin and obtain X 0(cmin) =   cmin · Y , whereby
Y ⌘ ↵  (1  ↵)  ↵cmin   (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵ (cmin((↵  (1  ↵)) ln(ca)  ↵) + ↵  (1  ↵)) .
To show that Y   0, we take the first-order derivative of Y with respect to ca:
@Y
@ca
=  (↵  (1  ↵))
2
1  ↵ (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵  1 · Z , Z ⌘ 1  cmin(1   ln(ca)).
Note that Z is (weakly) decreasing in cmin for all ca 2 [0, 1]. That is, if Z   0 for the highest
possible cmin = ca, Z   0 holds a fortiori for all cmin  ca. Evaluating Z at cmin = ca yields
Z|cmin=ca = 1  ca(1  ln(ca)). Given that @Z|cmin=ca@ca = 2c 1a ln(ca) < 0, if Z|cmin=ca   0 for the
highest possible ca = 1, Z|cmin=ca   0 holds a fortiori for all ca  1. Evaluating Z|cmin=ca at ca = 1
yields Z|cmin=ca=1 = 0. Since Z   0 for all permissible parameter values, we have Y 0(ca)  0.
Hence, if Y   0 for the highest possible ca = 1, we have Y   0 for all ca  1. Evaluating Y at
ca = 1 yields Y |ca=1 = 0. Since Y   0 for all permissible parameter values, we have X 0(cmin)  0.
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Hence, if X   0 for the highest possible cmin = 1, X   0 holds a fortiori for all cmin  1. Evaluating
X at cmin = 1 yields X|cmin=1 = 0. We thus have shown that N 0a()  0 for all parameter values,
whereby the sign of this first-order derivative is strict (rather than weak) if cmin < ca < 1. This
completes the proof of Proposition 1(ii).
Next, we analyze the eﬀect of cmin on the per capita number of armed oﬀenses. Diﬀerentiating
Na from equation (B.1) with respect to cmin yields:
N 0a(cmin) =
2c 1min
(1  cmin)2
( w)
↵
1 ↵
✓
1   
 
↵
p
◆ 1
1 ↵ ·⌦, where ⌦ ⌘ 1  ↵
↵  (1  ↵)
✓
1  (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵
◆
.
Note that the sign of N 0a(cmin) is determined by the sign of ⌦. If ↵  (1  ↵) > 0, we have ⌦ > 0,
since 1 ↵↵ (1 ↵) > 0 and (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵ < 1. Conversely, if ↵   (1   ↵) < 0, we have ⌦ > 0, since
1 ↵
↵ (1 ↵) < 0 and (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵ > 1.53 We thus have established N 0a(cmin) > 0.
Diﬀerentiating Na from equation (9) with respect to p, we obtain N 0a(p) =  c0a(p)xa(ca)f(ca) +R 1
ca
x0a(p)f(c)dc < 0, whereby the sign of this derivative results from c0a(p) > 0 and x0a(p) < 0,
cf. equations (8) and (9). Similarly, taking the first-order derivative of Na with respect to w yields
N 0a(w) =  c0a(w)xa(ca)f(ca)+
R 1
ca
x0a(w)f(c)dc > 0, whereby the sign of this derivative results from
c0a(w) < 0 and x0a(w) > 0, cf. equations (8) and (9).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
DiﬀerentiatingN from equation (11) with respect to g yieldsN 0(g) =  c0a(g)f(ca)[xa(ca) xu(ca)] <
0, whereby the sign of this derivative follows from the fact that c0a(g) > 0, see equation (8), and
xa(c) > xu(c) for any given c, cf. equations (2) and (6). This implies Proposition 2(i). To prove
Proposition 2(iii), we diﬀerentiate N from equation (11) with respect to   and obtain:
N 0( ) =
Z ca
cu
x0u( )f(c)dc+
Z 1
ca
x0a( )f(c)dc  c0u( )xu(cu)f(cu)  c0a(g)f(ca)[xa(ca)  xu(ca)] < 0,
whereby the sign of this derivative results from x0u( ) < 0, x0a( ) < 0, c0u( ) > 0, c0a( ) > 0, and
xa(c) > xu(c) for any given c, cf. equations (2), (6), and (8).
Using the definition of Pareto distribution from equation (10), the per capita number of total
oﬀenses can be expressed as:
N =
cmin
1  cmin
1  ↵
↵  (1  ↵)
✓
 
↵
1 ↵   (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵ ( 
↵
1 ↵   1)  (cu)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵
◆
w
↵
1 ↵
✓
1   
 
↵
p
◆ 1
1 ↵
,
whereby cu and ca are given by equation (8). Following the approach described in Appendix B.1,
we prove that N 0() < 0. This implies Proposition 2(ii) and completes the proof of Proposition 2.
53 For the ‘knife-edge’ case of ↵  (1  ↵) = 0, the sign of N 0a(cmin) is undetermined, cf. also Na from eq. (B.1).
42
C Distribution of criminal activities in the U.S.
To draw assumptions about the behavior and functional form of f(c), we use incident-level data
from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) by the UCR.54 More specifically,
we exploit the Property Segment of this data which contains information on the dollar value of
property stolen in a given incident. In the most recent year available, 2014, the UCR recorded
3,766,167 incidents of property theft in the U.S., with the minimum value of $0, maximum value
of $100,000,350 and the mean of $1,154. Figure C.1 depicts the density of incidents with stolen
property worth less than $10,000. Apart from the ‘spikes’ clustered around the round numbers of
500, 1000, 1500, etc., the density in this range appears to be non-increasing in its support.55
Figure C.1. Histogram of the value of property stolen by incident in the U.S. in 2014.
In the following, we show that the actual density of incidents of property theft in the U.S. can
be approximated by a Pareto distribution. For a discrete Pareto-distributed random variable, X,
the tail distribution (survival) function is given by
Pr[X   x] =
⇣xmin
x
⌘
, x   xmin,  > 0,
where xmin is the lower bound of the support and  is the shape parameter of this function. If
X is indeed distributed Pareto, the relationship between the frequency of theft and the value of
stolen property in log-log coordinates should be linear, with the slope equal to  .56 To assess
this relationship, we tabulate the data in fourteen successive bins, having the width increasing by
one unit on the logarithmic scale.57 Figure C.2 plots the log frequency of incidents within each bin
against the logarithmized mean dollar value of those incidents. The red line depicts the fitted linear
relationship between these variables and the associated OLS results are presented in the top right
corner. A high linear fit (R2 = 0.979) suggests that the actual distribution of U.S. crime can be
well approximated with a Pareto distribution with a shape parameter of  = 1.171.
54 These data are publicly available at https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/128.
55 These spikes can be attributed to the rounding errors in cases of the unknown true value of the stolen property.
56 To see this, note from the definition of the Pareto distribution that d log f(x)/d log x =  .
57 In our benchmark analysis, we do not consider incidents of stolen property worth less than $200 (i.e., set
xmin ⌘ 200). In most U.S. states, these incidents are classified as misdemeanors or “petty theft” and the
associated data entries in this range are likely to be subject to the above-mentioned measurement errors.
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Figure C.2. Binned distribution of the dollar value of property stolen in the U.S. in 2014.
We repeat this exercise for all U.S. states available in the NIBRS database (see Table C.1), as
well as individual counties (Table C.2 presents exemplary the results for the state of Massachusetts),
whereby N , R2, and  represent the sample size, linear fit, and the shape parameter, respectively.
Generally high R2 suggest that the Pareto distribution provides a good fit to the actual distribution
of criminal activities across U.S. states and counties. Moreover, notice from Table C.2 that the
dispersion of criminal activities (as measured by the parameter ) varies substantially across counties
that belong to the same state, despite the shared state-specific criminal law. In the main text, we
attribute this variation to diﬀerences in social capital.
Table C.1. Distribution of criminal activities across U.S. states.
State N R2  State N R2 
Alabama 3,426 0.953 0.778 Montana 38,646 0.938 0.984
Arizona 16,286 0.928 1.063 Nebraska 18,253 0.950 1.034
Arkansas 140,359 0.957 1.158 New Hampshire 38,268 0.960 0.911
Colorado 221,778 0.937 0.980 North Dakota 23,256 0.919 0.996
Connecticut 62,364 0.951 0.964 Ohio 373,845 0.976 1.113
Delaware 49,868 0.946 1.059 Oklahoma 45,230 0.910 1.016
DC 1,756 0.941 1.175 Oregon 81,955 0.955 1.016
Idaho 46,434 0.920 0.816 Pennsylvania 3,055 0.953 0.778
Illinois 12,162 0.949 0.977 Rhode Island 33,265 0.934 1.001
Indiana 2,031 0.858 0.678 South Carolina 267,509 0.955 1.143
Iowa 91,573 0.939 1.057 South Dakota 20,124 0.952 0.884
Kansas 104,144 0.953 1.063 Tennessee 365,586 0.966 1.139
Kentucky 133,787 0.957 1.039 Texas 171,967 0.945 1.058
Louisiana 21,863 0.935 0.996 Utah 114,265 0.950 1.038
Maine 10,670 0.934 1.029 Vermont 12,445 0.942 1.073
Massachusetts 144,788 0.965 1.011 Virginia 281,899 0.968 1.121
Michigan 301,047 0.942 1.166 Washington 306,601 0.930 1.169
Mississippi 11,310 0.943 0.943 West Virginia 42,090 0.965 1.001
Missouri 55,817 0.912 1.112 Wisconsin 94,442 0.933 1.138
Table C.2. Distribution of criminal activities across counties in Massachusetts.
County N R2  County N R2 
Barnstable 6,048 0.928 0.884 Hampshire 3,322 0.937 0.862
Berkshire 3,237 0.966 0.797 Middlesex 30,114 0.925 0.901
Bristol 16,774 0.950 0.958 Nantucket 384 0.965 0.583
Dukes 156 0.962 0.533 Norfolk 11,511 0.962 0.888
Essex 15,827 0.944 0.965 Plymouth 10,115 0.934 0.820
Franklin 1,530 0.934 0.931 Suﬀolk 4,381 0.898 0.974
Hampden 18,550 0.942 1.057 Worcester 22,476 0.944 1.035
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D Data Appendix
All crime-related measures in our paper are constructed using Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)
data by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).58 This data is available at the level of law
enforcement agencies (LEAs). We map all LEAs to U.S. counties using the 2012 Law Enforcement
Agency Identifiers Crosswalk by the U.S. Department of Justice.59 In the following, we detail the
construction of the main dependent and independent variables obtained from the UCR data.
GunHomicides and TotalHomicides are constructed using the UCR’s Supplementary Homicide
Reports (SHR) database. The SHR lists all known homicide incidents that took place in a given year
on the area monitored by a given LEA and provides information on the circumstance under which
a given homicide was committed. During the construction of our baseline measure of (gun-caused)
homicides, we excluded the following list of circumstances indicating an accident, negligence, or
killing of the (suspected) felon: ‘victim shot in hunting accident’, ‘gun-cleaning death - other than
self’, ‘children playing with gun’, ‘other negligent handling of gun’, ‘all other manslaughter by
negligence’, ‘felon killed by police’, ‘felon killed by private citizen’, ‘all suspected felony type’. We
further excluded rare circumstances that are hard to rationalize with our theoretical model, such
as ‘child killed by babysitter’, ‘institutional killings’, ‘sniper attack’, and ‘abortion’. Using SHR
information on the type of the oﬀender’s weapon, we identify all homicides that were committed by
one of the following firearm types: ‘handgun – pistol, revolver’, ‘rifle’, ‘shotgun’, ‘firearm, type not
stated’, and ‘other gun’. We then calculate the yearly sum of gun-caused and total (i.e., gun-caused
and gun-unrelated) homicides by LEA and aggregate this information to county-level data using
the above-mentioned LEA Identifiers Crosswalk. Using U.S. Census annual county-level population
data, we construct our proxies for the per capita number of GunHomicides and TotalHomicides.
GunRobberies and TotalRobberies. These measures are constructed using the UCR’s Oﬀenses
Known and Clearances by Arrest (OKCA) database, which reports, among other things, the ‘actual
number of gun robberies’ (ACT NUM GUN ROBBERY) and the ‘actual number of total robberies’
(ACT NUM ROBBERY TOTL). Both variables are reported at the LEA-level on a monthly basis.
The challenge behind aggregating this information to county-level annual measures lies in the fact
that OKCA codifies both zero and missing values as “0”. Following the methodology delineated
in the UCR codebooks, we distinguish missing (gun-related) robberies from “true” zeroes using
information on ‘grand total of all actual oﬀenses’ (ACT # ALL FIELDS). This process involves
several steps: First, we exploit information on the latest month reported in the yearly return
(NUMBER OF MONTHS REPORTED), to replace zero values in the ensuing months with missing
values. However, information on the latest reported month (say, November) does not necessarily
imply that all preceding (ten) months are included in the reports (see UCR codebooks). To identify
missing observations in the preceding months, we calculate in the second step the average monthly
58 This data is publicly available at https://icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/57.
59 This crosswalk is available at https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/00366. In our baseline
analysis, we drop observations from Alaska and Hawaii.
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number of grand total oﬀenses in a given LEA/year and replace this LEA’s “0”-values as missing
if the monthly average lies above a certain threshold. During the construction of our baseline
measures, we set this threshold equal to 15. That is, if the average monthly number of grand total
oﬀenses in a given LEA is larger than fifteen, we treat this LEA’s zero values as missing.60 Third,
we identify LEAs reporting oﬀenses quarterly, semiannually, or annually and replace “0”-values in
the non-reporting months as missing. Having distinguished missing values from true zeroes in grand
total oﬀenses, we replace all zero monthly values in gun-related and total robberies with missing
values if a LEA’s grand total oﬀenses in the respective month is missing. Missing monthly values in
gun-related and total robberies are then replaced by the averages in the respective category across
all months reported by a LEA in a given year. Monthly gun-related and total robberies are summed
up to annual LEA-level data, which, in turn, is aggregated to annual county-level data using the
LEA Identifiers Crosswalk. Using yearly population data from the U.S. Census, we construct our
proxies for the per capita number of GunRobberies and TotalRobberies in a given county-year.
IllegalGuns. Our proxy for the number of illegal guns is constructed using the UCR’s Property
Stolen and Recovered (PSR) database, which reports, among other things, the value of firearms
stolen in a given month in the area monitored by a given LEA. In the raw PSR data, both zero
and missing values as “0”. However, the PSR database contains twelve dummy variables (STATUS)
which indicate whether information in a given month was reported or not. Missing monthly values
in stolen firearm value are replaced by the average value of stolen firearms in a given year and the
annual LEA-level data is aggregated to the county level using the LEA Identifiers Crosswalk.
PoliceIntensity . Our measures of police intensity are constructed using the UCR’s Law Enforce-
ment Oﬃcers Killed or Assaulted (LEOKA) database. For each LEA/year, the LEOKA reports the
number of police oﬃcers per 1,000 population (OFFICER RATE PER 1,000 POP) and the number
of police employees per 1,000 population (EMPLOYEE RATE PER 1,000 POP).61 To construct
our baseline measure of police intensity, we calculate for each year the weighted average of the
police oﬃcers rate across all LEAs of a given county with weights being the fraction of a county’s
population served by a given LEA. In the robustness checks, we consider the weighted average rate
of police employees as an alternative proxy for police intensity in a given county.
60 Since the above-mentioned threshold is chosen arbitrarily, we run a wide range of unreported robustness checks
to ensure robust to considering alternative thresholds.
61 In years 1981-82, 1985-89, and 1995-96, these rates are reported per 10,000 population. The reported values of
police oﬃcers and employees in those years are multiplied by 10 for consistency. Due to the fact that the reported
values of police oﬃcers and employees in 1990 are exceptionally high (oftentimes exceeding the preceding years
by the factor of thirty) we replace these values in 1990 by an average of the years 1989 and 1991.
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